By Patricia Lee Sharpe
Remember the yellow cake forgery that was used by the Bush Administration to support the contention that Saddam Hussain was actively engaged in WMD development which, in turn, was used to justify the U.S. invasion of Iraq? This oh-so-convenient smoking gun letter turned out to have U.S. fingerprints all over it.
Now another very interesting letter has surfaced, and it’s not surprising that some Pakistanis and others are floating claims that it was produced by U.S. intelligence services. Thus, memories of dirty tricks past taint everything that comes after.
Is It or Isn't It?
Like others cited in this excellent WaPost article which reproduces the letter, I cannot pretend to know beyond a doubt whether this letter that purports to come from North Korean sources is authentic or not Some people have dismissed it for being written on plain paper, not on official stationary with a recognizable letterhead. Others have said that the plain paper tactic is well known as the preferred way for North Korean officials to communicate re sensitive issues and on this one they find the signature convincing. I might point out that the yellow cake forgery included the feigning of an appropriate letterhead.
Others have said the Khan letter is worth paying attention to because it appears to support rumors or allegations that have been circulating in clandestine circles for some time—rumors about high level Pakistani army involvement in the shopping around ofnuclear designs and equipment. The weakness of this argument as “proof” one way or another need not be elaborated, but it predisposes one to more serious consideration of the letter.
I’m more interested in the arguments of those who try to dismiss the letter by saying it’s been put in circulation only because A. Q. Khan is having another hissy fit over the way he’s been treated. As well he might, it seems to me. Nothing about the Pakistan government’s handling of the A. Q Khan affair has ever made much sense. The notion of “revenge” for selective punishment crops up here, and how natural and appropriate that would be. Khan has always seemed like a scapegoat to me, not an innocent by any means, but a plausible morsel provided with a gilded cage to keep him comfortably alive—and quiet.
Here’s an ultra simplified summary of the situation: whether or not A.Q. Khan is the one and only “father” of Pakistan’s “bomb,” is open to contention, but he certainly played a major role in meeting the threat posed by India’s possession of nuclear weapons capacity, which means he had access to critical, supposedly secret documents. He is alleged to have passed/sold these documents to North Korea and Libya, for example, along with centrifuges and/or other hardware. (A recent visit to North Korea by American expert Siegfried Hecker confirmed that North Korean production facilities conform to the designs to which Khan had access.) Meanwhile, when Khan’s possibly treasonous activities become public (or were made public), his punishment in Pakistan amounted to a slap on the wrist. He’s still their revered Father of the Bomb, but he was remanded to house arrest, since relaxed. The worst of this (aside from North Korea’s entry into the nuclear club) from the American point of view was that they couldn’t get at Khan. Pakistani authorities refused to make him available.
So why was Khan being treated so tenderly? And why was he muzzled? And what were Khan’s motives? Given his customers, there are two possible answers to this question and both might be true.
Helping to hasten Iran's or Libya's launching of additional Green Bomb brands might be understood as the kind of misguided idealism that leads to terrorism and worries the Pentagon greatly. Even if Khan were working mostly alone (possible only if the transfers are documents and not hardware), such a deal wouldn’t necessarily merit a harshly punitive response.
But North Korea? Except possibly to stick it to the U.S., what credible ideological or national security motive could there have been for helping North Korea? China, the not-India which is Pakistan’s great Alternative Friend, would hardly appreciate this complexity in North Asia. Money is the only possible motive here, and gentle treatment is illogical unless there are unnamed others in on the business, important others who need to be protected.
Who Needs Outing?
Yes, passing hot documents around can be a low cost, one man operation. But Khan was in the business of selling equipment, too. For this he needed collaborators, traders, shippers—a huge circle of associates who would have to be kept quiet, which is usually an expensive proposition. Also some elements of Pakistani officialdom, most likely the military, would have to be aware and collaborating. They would hardly do so for nothing or peanuts, especially if Khan himself had a good business going. In short, big smuggling requires greedy colluders, who might even have other deals on the side with the same foreign partners.
But big smuggling is also hard to keep under wraps forever. So who would have to be seen as taking the fall? Khan, obviously, and he had to be seen to have been punished. And yet Khan, handled too roughly, might spill all that he knows about those important others. If the generals named in the letter under discussion were indeed fellow connivers, is it any wonder that Pakistan’s then ruler Pervez Mussharaf treated Khan so tenderly—and that Americans were not allowed to interview him about a grave, supposedly common concern of Americans and Pakistanis: nuclear proliferation?
One can imagine/assume that Khan, being a wily sort, would not have left himself totally unprotected, that he might have kept some incriminating evidence on hand to use as needed, that he would have kept some chips to play. This letter under discussion, for example. And one can image that he might tire of living a more or less honored but cramped life while his collaborators are perfectly free to carry on as before. One can imagine anger. One can imagine resentment. One can imagine a decision that it’s time to play a few trump cards. It’s time for General Jehanjir Karamat and Lt. General Zulfiqar Khan to account publicly for their own interesting dealings with the North Koreans.
Karamat dismisses A.Q. Khan’s latest move as mere “blame shifting.” Z. Khan calls the letter “a fabrication.” But they would, wouldn’t they?
At any rate, if the letter is not genuine, the puzzles at the heart of the A. Q. Khan case are real and they remain unanswered. As for Khan, now that he’s proving to be so troublesome, should he stop worrying about freedom and start fearing for his life?
I admit that I’ve been speculating here. Other solutions to the puzzle are no doubt possible. WV invites a response.