By Patricia Lee Sharpe
Money usually talks, and big money is usually very persuasive.
As between the U.S. and Pakistan that doesn’t seem to be the case, although the U.S. has allocated billions to Pakistan's military plus so many billions more to so many projects and contractors that no one knows how it’s been spent.
The money-for-allies equation isn’t particularly shameful, actually. It’s almost a norm. But it’s supposed to work. When it doesn’t, the spigot usually goes dry or the flow diminishes. In the case of Pakistan, the flow continues. We won’t go into the folly of the U.S. throwing good money after bad year after year, but you’d think that a few billion would buy something in the way of loyalty or compliance or truly significant cooperation.
Why has this not been the case with Pakistan in recent years?
First of all, the U.S. labors under a history of being regarded as a bad friend, the kind that uses a buddy then abandons him. This is the Cold War history, according to Pakistanis who don’t trust the U.S. Worse, perhaps, the U.S. has a history of not shunning India, the arch enemy, consistently enough.
So far as enemies are concerned, the U.S. spends a lot of time trying to persuade the Pakistani leadership that al Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and related Islamists are a graver menace to the Pakistani state itself, at the very least to the state as constituted under its present, rather bruised, democratic and secular constitution. Pakistan takes the cash, but is clearly more interested in keeping Indian influence out of Afghanistan than in neutering the elements that are bombing Pakistani cities. As for apprehending those behind the attack on Mumbai two winters ago, it’s likely that at least a trickle of the flood of U.S. aid money finds its way into terrorist hands via sympathetic military collaborators. That sort of thing is certainly true of U.S. aid to Afghanistan.
Of course, there’s sovereignty to consider. And national honor. As if there aren’t entirely dignified ways to accept and use aid in a way that’s consistent with its granting. So something else must be at work.
And I finally figured it out. There’s another friend. A friend who’s also a neighbor. Maybe Pakistan doesn’t see the U.S. as so essential anymore. But money is always welcome, so the preachy visits from generals and special representatives and other American dignitaries are tolerated with the superficial grace any well brought up Pakistani can lavish as needed.
And which country might be seen to be thoroughly on Pakistan’s side, at the present time? Which country challenges India’s borders? Which country is encircling India with an ever mightier blue water fleet and a ring of pearls aka ports, including the deep water port China’s financing at Gwadar in Baluchistan? Which country is building roads from Western China down to the port? No doubt Pakistan hopes to benefit financially from such infrastructure, but Pakistan’s existing port of Karachi will be badly sidelined as Chinese goods make their cost-cutting, efficient, non- stop way to market through underpopulated high desert and higher mountains. No doubt that port will be useful to Pakistani exporters as well, but will Pakistan’s output be able to compete with China’s internally or externally? If there are any, that is. Should the Taliban continue to wreak havoc or extend their power further, there won’t be much Pakistani industry to compete with anyone. The Taliban record in Afghanistan while they were in power was economic disaster—and the Shi’a regime in Iran isn’t much better at making an economy grow.
On the ever contentious Kashmir issue, China is also a better friend. While the U.S. tends to push for a permanently divided Kashmir by turning the Line of Control into an international border, China refuses to issue normal visas to Kashmiri residents holding Indian passports. Their Indian passports aren’t stamped by Chinese immigration authorities. They receive instead a visa document that’s “stapled” into the passport. Thus, China appears to be backing Pakistan’s refusal to recognize any part of Kashmir as an integral part of India. Pakistan also appreciates China’s disinclination to welcome India’s candidacy for a seat as Permanent Member on the U.N. Security Council, even through the other permanent members, including the U.S., see considerable logic to it. A marginalized India is clearly in China’s interest and (for very different reasons) Pakistan’s. A weak India does not serve U.S. interests.
Finally, let’s consider the issue of acceptance re friendship. China’s habit of ignoring human rights abuses wherever it has significant economic or politic interests suits Pakistan very nicely. The U.S., on the other hand, is constantly and tediously preaching about democracy, human rights, minority rights, women’s rights, rule of law, corruption, corruption, corruption, to say nothing about the incessant carping over Pakistan’s not quite covert support for militant Islamist groups.
It’s true that the U.S. has a certain history of making do with “our bastard” when necessary. This was often true during the Cold War, and the “War on Terrorism” has seen a revival of marriages of necessity. In such cases, however, it’s usual to mute the criticism. With Pakistan the U.S. is not only pleading (and paying) for support but pressing at the same time for profound social and political change. Naturally this nettles.
Alliances like marriages fall apart when partners try too hard to change one another. No doubt Pakistan would like to continue its profitable dalliance with two wives, one rich, generous and demanding, the other generally sweeter for now. Why not? It's paying off for Pakistan. Is it really working for the U.S.?