Why is American foreign policy so diplomatically light but so militarily heavy? No, I’m not imagining things. And it’s been that way for decades – George W. Bush and Dick Cheney just pushed the envelope further in that direction after 9/11.
Yet this is a fundamental question that Americans should not only be asking, but also attempting to resolve because diplomatic solutions, negotiations and conflict management are far less expensive (listen up Teapotter conservatives who long for small government and a miniscule federal budget – except, of course, for the military, roads and their Medicare and VA benefits), certainly less lethal, normally more effective with the neighbors and often just plain good foreign relations common sense.
Not always that way
According to University of Wisconsin history professor Jeremy Suri, it wasn’t always that way. The shift in emphasis came at the end of World War II with the advent of America's anti-Communism policy of Containment and the National Security Act of 1947. The Act restructured – and greatly strengthened – the US military but, as Suri points out, nothing of the sort was created to counterbalance its effects on US foreign policy at the State Department.
The way the Cold War was conceptualized in the US, America tilted heavily towards reliance on preponderant military strength. This was also used as a way to persuade the American public to and sell the US Congress on support for a policy weighted towards consequent military growth.
One also has to wonder, however, whether at the time the alternative would have been a retreat into the equally misguided isolationism of Jesse Helms and if the Containment policy wasn't partially, at least, designed as a counter-balance. Then, of course, Joe McCarthy’s anti-Communist witch hunt came along which damaged not only American universities, intellectuals, and the entertainment industry but also the State Department decimating the ranks of the China hands who, because they predicted Mao's victory, were somehow blamed for it.
Regardless, as a part of the Containment policy, Suri argues that entering into negotiations was too often considered from the position of overwhelming strength – yet, as we should recognize today – and should have recognized from our own earlier history – the application of preponderant military strength is often not the solution to non-military problems particularly in countries and regions located at the end of our supply chain with cultures and ambitions we do not understand.
How to make fundamental changes?
The question in my mind, then, is how to effect the systemic seismic changes required. I agree with Suri who argues that the US should eliminate the concept of containment from its foreign policy lexicon and emphasize that of engagement (which I think Obama has largely done), that alliances should be seen as ongoing processes and relationships and that there needs to be a Constitutional revision of the National Security Act. Suri also suggests the establishment of a ROTC for the State Department as a way of training future diplomats.
I think he’s basically right although the Peace Corps, in particular, provides an excellent background. But my question is how a seismic shift of the sort he proposes can be done when the State Department, USAID and whatever little else is left of the battered civilian side of America’s foreign affairs bureaucracy have too often demonstrated their inability to pull their own weight. They cannot be rebuilt overnight. This will take time, considerable funds, enlightened management, a major cultural/personality change in the Department itself and long term dedication.
Increases fine - but it will take far more to correct the Herculean problems
Congress has just agreed to increase the number of Foreign Service Officers by 1,000 (700 at State and 300 at USAID) next year. That’s all to the good. But what about the Peace Corps and where will those 700 newbies at State be assigned? Stamping visas every one?
In reality, these projected increases are 1) a drop in the bucket (the good news is that the phrase that there are more members of military bands than US Foreign Service Officers has finally become part of the vernacular) when the State Department still can’t manage its personnel well; 2) the Foreign Service Act of 1980 continues to force out too many competent officers at the peak of their careers for no good reason; and 3) it takes years (like about 20) to develop a seasoned officer with the requisite skills and foreign language ability to function well overseas. Just in time, as it turns out, for many to be retired prematurely.
Reverence for all things military needs a civilian check
Besides, there is a countervailing wind in this country that reveres the military and counts on military bases and contracts to keep state and local economies in the gravy and young men employed and off the streets.
If only the State Department powers-that-be were half as clever as the US military and took American foreign affairs interests to the state and local levels not to mention into the halls of Congress. But I have scant evidence that State understands the importance of developing a domestic constituency. It certainly hasn't acted that way. Until then, I doubt little will change. But it should.