By Patricia H. Kushlis
I’m not sure who was asleep at which switch or what impact
current Russian anger will have over the American decision to base short and
medium range SM-3 missile interceptors on Romanian soil beginning in 2015 – and
the Romanian government’s agreement.
The Russians claim that the US did not consult with them about
the Romanian interceptor missile basing decision despite, according to Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov, that the Russian and American presidents had agreed
that the “threats and risks of missile proliferation will be assessed jointly
step by step.” This is also likely accurate.
But since when do promises of consultations on missile
proliferation equal step by step consultation about a country’s missile defense
intentions?
Why Not Object Earlier?
Moreover, if the Russians were so concerned last summer why
didn’t they object publicly when the US agreed to scrap the proposed controversial
missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic but announced it would replace them with a
new and updated missile defense plan to include land based missile interceptors likely
elsewhere in Europe? The Obama
administration didn’t do this behind anyone’s back. The stories were all over the media at the time.
The US decision was made in part to keep the
Russians at the START Treaty replacement negotiating table precisely because the
Obama administration was well aware of the Russian government’s allergy to US
missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic – despite the fact that the
Russians knew that those proposed sites were designed to protect against a
potential Iranian threat and would not have affected the nuclear balance
between the US and the Russian Republic one iota.
Hard to Have It Both Ways
If I remember correctly, the START replacement treaty is
something that the Russians had lobbied the US for for years but the Bush
administration had adamantly refused to even consider. In contrast, the Obama
administration indicated
an about face in policy in line with the new President's desire for a nuclear weapons free world and willingness to engage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
Can the Russians really expect to have it both ways? Would they prefer a return to the previous eight years? Is the latest Russian petulance
simply a last minute negotiating tactic? Or is it something else?
It’s been widely known for decades that the Russians become
apoplectic at the very whisper “missile defense.” By the way, I believe that they had, in their previous incarnation as the Soviet Union, a missile defense system ringing Moscow.Whether the system would have worked, is another question – fortunately, it never had to withstand a real life test.
Russian fears
What the Russians fear most is that a functioning American
missile defense system against long range missiles would render Russia defenseless against the US. This is not an unreasonable fear particularly when viewed through the prism of the Old Cold War and games great powers play. But the US
interceptor missiles destined for Romania are not effective against
long range missiles – and the Russians also know this. So what’s the problem? Will the Russians really turn this into a START
replacement treaty deal breaker?
Rough Sledding Ahead?
I’m skeptical since the deal’s basically in
place – both sides say so – but as New York Times reporter Ellen Barry suggested in her February 6, 2010 article more likely the differences between the two countries on missile defense - among
other issues - could mean rough sledding ahead in US-Russian relations over the
next few years.
What scares Russian analysts is that the Romanian missile
defense equation might change “when a second generation of (US) interceptors is
put in place in 2018” and that the Russian government would have no say in
preventing this from occurring. Well, yes, I suppose the equation might change eight years down the road - providing the US makes a sudden breakthrough in missile defense technology. But thus far I've certainly not seen reports to indicate that a "star wars" type Armegeddon is much closer to reality than it was several years ago.
As Old as the Hills
What I do know, however, is that the Russians have just
concluded their ten year defense projection – akin to the US military’s
Quadrennial defense review – and as result are likely scanning the horizon more
intently than usual through sharply tuned potential threat assessment binoculars. So the possibilities of missile defense, fears of continued
NATO enlargement (read Ukraine and/or Georgia), combined with Hillary Clinton’s
rejection of a Russian proposal for a “new European security structure” as well
as calls from Sweden and Poland for withdrawal of Russian nuclear missiles from
Kaliningrad (that tiny Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea between Poland and
Lithuania that is restive under continued Russian rule) are all wrapped up in
the Russian government’s reaction that recently erupted in public. Nevertheless, the perceived threats and Russian
counter-proposals are as old as the hills. So too is a US rejection of
a Russian call for a new European security structure. This would, of course, provide greater Russian
say in the continent’s affairs– just pull out the old Soviet national
security playbook and you’ll find it there.
What Is New
But what is different is a new assertiveness from the Poles
and the Swedes vis-à-vis Russian nuclear weapons based in Kaliningrad – not, at least on the surface,an unreasonable request for their removal on the part of close and nervous neighbors. Yet, if Russia really wants to be accepted as a part of Europe,
then it needs to think about how it treats its neighborhood.
This includes rethinking use of its considerable energy resources as
a weapon to bludgeon the energy dependent Europeans. Continuing to working with the US
and the Europeans in dealing constructively with a recalcitrant Iran would also
help. There are numerous deals and trade-offs that could and should be made to make Europe and the Middle
East safer for all. This involves the Russia Federation.