By Patricia Lee Sharpe
Last Friday, just before Pakistan’s army finally moved into South Waziristan, an American friend asked me, “What are we going to do about Pakistan?”This was my reply: “What are we going to do? Nothing rash, I hope. It’s Pakistan’s war.”
And that would still be my reply. The army moved into South Waziristan with a force of about 33,000, a fairly modest contingent, considering the fact that Pakistan has an army of about 500,000 on active duty and an equal number of reserves. This means that most troops are still guarding the border with India. It also means that heavy reinforcements are theoretically available.
A Serious, Well-Supported Effort
However, this unexpectedly small force is probably not an indication of the half-heartedness with which previous forays into the tribal areas were launched. Those attempts to squelch assorted militant Islamists relied heavily on the frontier militias, which have neither the training nor the equipment to wage war in earnest. In addition, Pakistan was not then willing to take many casualties. When the going got tough, government forces were pulled out.This time the war is for real, the stakes are high, and the Pakistani population, by and large, strongly support the move, as was not the case with earlier efforts. Even six months ago, neither the army nor the people were ready for costly all-out war against any Taliban elements. Compromise, conciliation, containment—these were the preferred approaches to militant Islam: stay on your side of the line and we’ll leave you alone. Besides, the war against terrorism was seen as an American priority rudely foisted on Pakistan, and Pakistanis have a less than wholehearted love for the U.S.
Taliban Miscalculations
Then came Swat, where the deal broke down. First of all, the Taliban, metaphorically drunk on success, got too brutal too soon in an area that the generality of Pakistanis consider far less alien than the “backward” Federally Administered Tribal Areas which have long been left more or less to themselves. Then they began pushing out of Swat into contiguous areas, closer and closer to Islamabad, which meant—Wow!—they’re coming for us, too! Result: Pakistanis supported the Army offensive in Swat, not for America’s sake, but for their own. At this point, the Taliban might have made the best of a beating. They might have retreated North to more sympathetic areas. Instead they misread the tea leaves. They retaliated with a vengence, launching a bloody bombing campaign in every corner of the country, hoping to frighten Pakistanis into accepting the inevitably of a Taliban takeover. Chest-thumping interviews with Taliban leaders reinforced the fear campaign. As a result, a number of foreign observers have begun to predict the imminent disintegration of Pakistan.On the contrary. Taliban brashness has galvanized the Army and the population. One hopes that the interminable delay in finally launching the operation in South Waziristan was caused by the determination to plan very carefully how to approach a very tough enemy who is going to be fighting for survival in very challenging terrain. To accomplish this mission the Pakistani Army is going to need time. The campaign is officially scheduled to last two months, but it took longer than that to make the much smaller Swat valley safe enough for people to consider returning home. Furthermore, the army and Pakistani society are also going to have to be willing to accept heavy casualties. Fortunately, the delay caused by deliberation allowed tens of thousands to flee the anticipated battle zone, which will mitigate non-combatant casualties in this lightly populated area.
No Comparison
We should pause here to reflect that the Pakistani army’s push into South Waziristan is not comparable to an American invasion, occupation, exercise—call it what you will—to the North in Afghanistan. Americans are complete and total foreigners in South Asia. Ethnic differences notwithstanding, the inhabitants of F.A.T.A., by and large, consider themselves Pakistanis. Their big beef, according to many analysts, is that the government in Islamabad has by-passed them developmentally, although certain consequences of any really big development project would probably be equally unpopular: accelerated social change in a very conservative society. Whether considered as respect or neglect, the result of decades of hands-off governance has been isolation and stagnation—and lots of unhappy unemployed young men aka Taliban fighters-in-the-making. The irony here is that Islam à la Taliban isn’t particularly respectful of tribal customs either. What’s more, the Taliban and their local sympathizers have mercilessly killed tribal leaders who haven’t bent to their wishes. As a result, the Pakistani Army is likely to find many allies on the ground, assuming tribals feel confident that the Taliban will be defeated. The Taliban do not deal gently with collaborators.So the army has to win this campaign in South Waziristan. They have to win it for the people in the tribal as well as the settled areas. They have to win it for the honor of the army itself. Because they have attacked in such numbers, with such well publicized intentions and without the protective facade of the frontier force, the army cannot afford to fail or to retreat. However, whatever happens, the ultimate consequence of failure is unlikely to be the disintegration of Pakistan. After a messy period of consolidation, the result will be a radical change of governance—stability with a vengeance. And there’s no way the U.S. can invade Pakistan to prevent such an outcome. The US population is 300 million. The population of Iraq is 29 million, the population of Afghanistan is 33 million, while the population of Pakistan is 172 million—plus Pakistan has a modern army and that nuclear arsenal. If the Pakistanis can’t protect the secular Muslim country created by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Americans can’t do it for them.
Back to my friend’s question. What should the Americans do? No doubt, there will be the need to replace weapons and equipment as well as to provide intelligence and drone services, as deemed appropriate.
The India Card
But there’s something perhaps even more important that the U.S. can do, and it touches on India, Pakistan’s traditional nemesis: persuading India to inform Pakistan that India will not take military advantage of its army’s preoccupation along the northern borders. The corollary calls for the U.S. to convice Pakistan to believe any such Indian assurances so that troops stationed along the Indian border can be redeployed, if needed for the campaign in South Waziristan. This won’t be easy. There are many in Pakistan who blame India for all the death and destruction in Pakistani cities—even though the Taliban usually, proudly, claim responsibility for the suicide bombings. India will also have to pledge not to violate the Line of Control in Kashmir. Since India has long been willing to recognize the Line of Control as an international boundary between the two countries, such a violation is unlikely, but it might be useful to make the message perfectly clear.Why would India cooperate? No rational Indian leader wants to face a Pakistani government run by Islamists who have sworn to come after India next. India’s population is about 20% Muslim. So far Indian Muslims at all economic levels have been fairly unresponsive to radical Islam, but an Islamic state or a truly failed state would, intentionally or by sheer political osmosis, leak discord across the border into India. Anything that will keep a relatively coherent secular state functioning next door is in India’s interest.
What else can we do? If the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan can keep Taliban elements from fleeing to a safe haven in Afghanistan, the benefit would be great to Pakistan and to U.S. efforts north of the border. This service would involve some tolerance of irony. (Yes, more irony.) The Paks have been largely indifferent to American demands to close the border to fleeing Afghan Taliban forces. However, this is no time for short-sighted tit-for-tatism
A Good Start
Already some U.S. and the U.K. observers are complaining that the Pakistani army, by moving only into South Waziristan at the moment, is simply looking after its own national interests, even as well-known violent Islamists enjoy protection in North Waziristan and other tribal areas. To such premature critics I would reply that any campaign has to start somewhere. Assuming the army succeeds in suppressing the Taliban in South Waziristan, I don’t know what they will do next. Maybe nothing. But perhaps by then it will have occurred to Pakistan’s leaders that Islamabad cannot be safe so long as bin Laden and Mullah Omar and the Haqqanis and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar live unmolested in Baluchistan or the tribal areas.Meanwhile, surely we should be thankful for this not so small favor which threatens the Pakistani Taliban in their stronghold. After all, they are not entirely unlinked to their Afghan cousins in blood and theology. If the South Waziristan campaign is not successful, nothing more robust can be expected.