by Cheryl Rofer
North Korea and Iran often get pointed to as practitioners of non-rational diplomacy. That’s a dangerous thing to do. If they’re not rational, you can’t figure out what they will do next. But saying that they’re not rational may merely indicate that you’re not smart enough to figure out what they’ll do next. Or worse, that they’re not doing what you would do in their place or what you want them to do.
It’s always better to assume that countries or their leaders are acting rationally. That’s the only basis for analysis. Assuming that they’re not rational is equivalent to throwing up your hands or saying that you’re going to go ahead and do what you wanted to do, damn the torpedoes.
It’s not a bad first assumption that those in power want to remain in power and that they are likely to take strong steps to do that. The next is to figure out what they see as threats to their power.
By now, we should be able to see patterns in North Korea’s behavior. This week’s walkout from the six-party talks and ejection of inspectors and experts group is another temper-tantrum-like response to world criticism. Kim Jong Il said that’s what he would do if there was adverse reaction to his missile test, and he did it. That’s rational.
What threats does he see? Regime change by the US. Sanctions against the luxury goods he likes and the finances he needs, as in recent statements by President Barack Obama and the UN resolution in response to the missile test. Given that he rules a strapped economy that nobody in the neighborhood much likes, he probably sees these threats as more dire than we may.
What is his leverage? Proximity to Seoul, so that a war would destroy both parts of Korea, with probably some slop-over to Japan. That’s part of his message in the missile test. And that nuclear program. War is a bit extreme, so he sticks with the nuclear program. It’s worked before.
The Yongbyon reactor facility has been in the process of disablement, something we don’t hear much about from the MSM. I suspect that the US State Department is advising those involved to keep a low profile, but it’s not entirely under the radar, if you pay attention. Andreas Persbo writes about it, and I know that Los Alamos people are involved. But they don’t talk much about it. They are the experts group that was just thrown out, along with the IAEA inspectors. Persbo speculates on what has been done in disablement, which has also been kept quiet.
There is time to cajole the North Koreans back to the table, and actions are being taken to do that. Persbo:
And this is possibly why the Russian Foreign Minister is about to visit Pyongyang quite soon, and why the Chinese are placing frantic phone calls to Washington DC.Or there’s that wily New Mexican who made friends with the Northerners a number of years back:
Richardson is said to have been in contact with North Korean leaders after they launched a long-range missile earlier this month, but that is a subject he declined to discuss.That last is quite hopeful: the North Koreans want to keep talking; they just want to look like they don’t want to keep talking. And you can bet that Big Bill R is talking to Hillary, even if Big Dog Bill is still irritated at him.
Here’s an article that lays it out nicely. It’s all about regime change. Kim Jong Il wants to stay in power. Quite rational.
And a small gripe, Washington Post! Why the links to your internal country guides but not to Sig Hecker’s report? Oooh, that might take the reader out of your site! Horrors!
Tom Friedman’s Cartoon
I’m not a big fan of Tom Friedman because he shoves everything into pithy and distorting analogies. I’m a great believer in keeping emotion out of foreign policy analysis, as far as one can. It’s hard to do, and diving into a pool of warm fuzzies or flat and hot cement exacerbates the problem. He frequently makes good points, but I feel like I have to swim through a hot-fudge sundae to find them.
So in leading up to his exhortation to President Obama not to take a middle path simply for the sake of taking a middle path, he tells us
And in the case of the strong states — Iran and North Korea — we would have to generate much more effective leverage from the outside to get them to change their behavior along the lines we seek. In both cases, though, success surely would require a bigger and longer U.S. investment of money and power, not to mention allies.Ah yes, let’s twist their arms until they do what we want them to do. Just what Kim Jong Il is reacting to in his latest edict. Well done, Tom! It’s just like talking to foreigners: if they don’t understand English, shout louder.
Friedman’s problem is the same as John Bolton’s. He hasn’t thought out the consequences, much less asked what history suggests they might be. It’s easy to react and think that more force, or shouting, or perhaps acquiescence (not the same as Bill Richardson’s quiet diplomacy) will get the results we want. It really helps to think out scenarios that might follow the emotionally satisfying action. Annie Lowrey has a scenario for the followon to an emotionally satisfying (to some) secession by Texas (h/t to Ezra Klein). The United States dealt with secession once before. It wasn’t pretty. Would it be the same again? Probably not, but Lowrey brings up a number of points that the secessionists should consider.