By Patricia H. Kushlis
About two-thirds of the way through the first presidential debate last week, John McCain made the following observation about US foreign policy:
“The point is that throughout history, whether it be Ronald Reagan, who wouldn't sit down with Brezhnev, Andropov or Chernenko until Gorbachev was ready with glasnost and perestroika.” – John McCain, Presidential Debate.
Huh?
It’s hard enough to follow John McCain’s twisted history here – let along language and logic but I think the record is pretty clear that Reagan’s approach to meeting and communicating with the Soviet leadership did not involve the “precondition” of glasnost (transparency) or perestroika (restructuring) and had little relationship to preconditions at all except perhaps a single one entangled in tit-for-tat hostage-taking begun by the FBI.
This nasty little tit-for-tat episode began with an FBI arrest of a Soviet agent in New York and Soviet retaliation through the arrest of Nick Daniloff, a US correspondent based in Moscow. Had the FBI simply sent the Soviet agent packing as was normally the case when spies were caught by either side during the Cold War, Daniloff would have never been arrested. Thus, there would have been no such incident to cloud further the then testy state of US-Soviet relations.
In any event, Reagan’s first letter to a Soviet leader was to Leonid Brezhnev shortly after Reagan’s inauguration – but it led to naught. By that time, the ailing Brezhnev was probably not capable of a serious response. The record also indicates that Reagan corresponded with Gobachev’s predecessor, Chernenko until Cernenko’s death.
The break-through: Reagan’s first Summit proposal to Gorbachev, March 13, 1985
Reagan’s first letter to Mikhail Gorbachev was hand-delivered by Vice President George H.W. Bush on March 13, 1985 during a Bush visit to Moscow just two days after Gorbachev had become General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Reagan’s letter included an invitation to a Summit. At that juncture, perestroika and glasnost would have been no more than a twinkle in Gorbachev’s eye – if that – so there’s no way Reagan could have linked that first invitation for a Summit to Gorbachev’s subsequent change in domestic policy direction.
For the record: a little “perestroika and glasnost” history
The term “perestroika” first appeared in a speech by Gorbachev on July 31, 1986 in which he referred to “perestroika in the political system.” The concepts of perestroika and glasnost appear initially in a now declassified policy memorandum to Gorbachev from his advisor Alexander Yakovlev. This memo was dated December 25, 1985.
Reagan’s first Summit with Gorbachev occurred in Geneva November 19-21, 1985 where, according to US Ambassador Jack Matlock in his 1995 book Autopsy of an Empire, “the two found common language talking about war and peace.” Note the dates: the Geneva Summit occurred well before Gorbachev’s first mention of “perestroika” and more than a month before Yakovlev’s Memo suggesting the new approach to Soviet domestic politics.
On to Reykjavik, Oct. 11-12, 1986
Perhaps the single most important meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev occurred in Reykjavik Oct. 11-12, 1986. This meeting did take place after Gorbachev had unveiled the concept of “perestroika” at home – but neither perestroika nor glasnost appears on the Reykjavik agenda or in the declassified notes taken during the meeting.
A single Soviet document now in the National Security Archive at George Washington University indicates that Reagan, had, in fact, quietly issued a precondition for the Reykjavik meeting. This was the release of Daniloff as well as the freeing of a number of Soviet dissidents then in jail in the Soviet Union. At or near the top of the list was Yuri Orlov. It appears as if from the Soviet source that mentions the pre-condition - although neither declassified American documents nor Matlock’s book do - the Soviets, in fact, agreed to meet at least part of Reagan’s demand.
Or maybe not. Could also have been limited to behind the scenes hostage horse-trading
History tells us that Daniloff was released and Soviet dissident Yuri Orlov was allowed to leave the Soviet Union a couple of weeks before Reykjavik took place. Yet, it’s also possible that Daniloff’s release had as much to do with the American expulsion of 25 Soviet diplomats from the Soviet UN Mission in retaliation for the journalist’s arrest as well as with the US release of the Soviet agent from jail in New York after he entered a plea of no contest.
Anyway, here’s the gist of Matlock’s description of the preparations for the Reykjavik meeting:
Reagan wanted to meet with Gorbachev. The only possible precondition as suggested by Matlock had come from Gorbachev. This was his insistence that there be a bilateral arms control treaty to sign when he came to Washington for a Summit. As it turned out, the two sides agreed on a quasi-summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland located halfway between the two capitals with no arms control agreement signing precondition - or any other preconditions - to be met by either side.
So. What Ever Happened to a Little Basic Research and the Straight-Talk Express?
Why then are today’s neoconservative Republicans so wedded to the notion that the US needs to demand major preconditions before even speaking to the Iranians or representatives of other countries whose leaders they despise? And why does McCain insist upon linking this unproductive foreign policy approach to Ronald Reagan even when the record shows that Reagan made no such linkages?
What ever happened, in short, to a little basic research - not to mention once-upon-a-time Straight-Talk Express?