by Cheryl Rofer
Previous posts in this series:
Why They Want Them
Why They Don’t Want Them
Challenge
I apologize for taking so long to work this post out, but it’s the hardest so far, and real life does sometimes intervene.
We’ll skip over how the various countries may have gotten their nuclear weapons—although the methods were many and ingenious—and move to my central question: what does a country do with an arsenal of 1-5 nuclear weapons?
1. Protect them carefully. Deichman makes this point number one. They’re no good to you if terrorists, commandos or other unauthorized people can take them away from you. Arhering suggests that a protective force could be part of a bluff, making a show of protecting nothing.
2. Let the world know you have them. An effective way to do this is to stage an underground test (Deichman, Armchair Generalist, Arhering, ZenPundit, Fester). Eddie’s Iraqi Kurds take IAEA inspectors on a tour of a nuclear bunker while the Iranian Kurds explain their postion to the Iranian government; a dissident American official leaks classified papers, which contribute to the credibility of the Kurds’ claims. Fester suggests that the danger in a nuclear test is that it will fizzle.
3. Bluff to keep others guessing as to how many you have and where they are. Armchair Generalist suggests that both dummies and mobile launchers be used.
I'll need at least five nuclear missiles, just in case the United States offers my adversarial neighbor some Patriot launchers. Three of them will be in silos, two of them will be in mobile launchers, maybe a railroad platform. Probably will have to construct five dummy missiles to confuse the US satellites, keep 'em guessing which ones are which.ZenPundit suggests that the methods in which the weapons might be employed also be subject to tactics of confusion.
4. Develop a propaganda campaign to tell the world (maybe even convince them) that you have developed nuclear weapons to protect your country (Deichman, Armchair Generalist). ZenPundit puts a twist on this to dissuade the United States and other biggies from pre-emptive strikes.
5. Pre-position small weapons to be used in nuclear blackmail (Arhering). The bluff here would be the positioning of dummy weapons in addition to the real ones. Fester suggests that the purpose of the positioning would be internal sabotage.
They can be emplaced under very strict command and control to destroy critical infrastructure that would severely negate the conquest value of a country. However they should not be counted on to prevent an invasion as the deterrant value may or may not be recognized as credible due to the limited number of weapons produce which would preclude the ability to credibly test the weapons.
6. ZenPundit suggests that the possession of nuclear weapons could be a lever for increased economic connectivity.
First, our diplomats and our economics ministries must try their hardest to connect to as many other centers of power as possible. The more great powers that benefit from economic connectivity with our country, the more IGO and NGO’s active and engaged in a process with our government, the greater the media attention the more restricted the options of those who seek to isolate us.
Andy has provided Stratfor’s classification of the purposes of nuclear arsenals. My opinion of Stratfor is not particularly high, but they do tend to be better at analysis than prediction. It seems to me that their classification doesn’t fit what we’re doing here very well.
I see some weaknesses in some of these scenarios, but I think that it’s time for the rest of you to chime in. That would include kibitizers as well as the scenario-writers. Have I gotten something wrong or left something out? Good points in the scenarios? Bad points? Would you change your scenario? How?