By Patricia Lee Sharpe
Who hates us? Who loves us? Who’s an enemy? Who’s an ally? These are important questions, but the people who presume to answer them for us often seem to be more than a little disingenuous—or just plain ignorant—when they try to persuade Americans that we’d be fine if we could shut down the Shia and rely on the Sunni, among whom we have so many staunch friends.
Let’s look at a few Sunni rulers in the Middle East, beginning with the Saud corporation.
The ruling Al Saud family in Saudi (what else!) Arabia are Sunni. The Bush family have been in profitable alliance with this large parasitic family, who rule but do not represent the native born residents of their share of the Arabian peninsula. In the past there was a useful little pact: the U.S. gave the al Sauds the military wherewithal to feel secure as they pumped oil out of the sand, while the Sauds gave America the oil required to fuel and lubricate our life style. The deal worked to America’s advantage (it seemed) so long as America was the primary reliable customer for oil. The apparent excess of supply over demand kept prices low enough to sustain America’s now notorious car culture. Unfortunately, there are friends and friends, as evidenced by George W. Bush’s unsuccessful oil-begging trip to Saudi Arabia last week. It seems there are other big customers for oil these days.
Meanwhile, the non-democratic Saddam Hussain was a Sunni, but he was not a friend—except when he was at war with Iran, in which case he was such a good friend that we evidently helped him out with the chemical weapons we would later condemn him for using on the wrong enemies. Afterwards, when he decided to gobble up Kuwait, he became an enemy, of course. Bush the 41st, having won the first Iraq war, gave a humbled Saddam a chance to be a friend again, but Saddam bit the hand that would befriend him, and, to show his father what real manhood is, Bush the 43rd hung him. Soon we were to discover that the Sunni of Iraq didn’t want to be our friends, though the Shia were delighted with the results of our incursion: a Shia majority (surprise! surprise!) claimed the right to rule, but the winners in their internal power struggle weren’t the cohorts of the scheming secular Chelabi, but those allied to warring clerical factions, all of whom turned out to be more or less friendly with Iran. This causes more than a little grief for the Iraqi government’s friendship with America. Friendship, evidently, is supposed to be monogamous!
In Afghanistan, the Taliban are 100% Sunni, but they are not our friends, while the Hazara and most other members of the Eastern Alliance with whom we joined up during the anti-Soviet war on Afghan territory were Shia, which didn’t keep them from being our close friends. President Karzai, a Sunni, is obliged to pretend he is a friend, but he looks so unhappy when he complains about U.S. troops' collateral damage to Afghan civilians that I wouldn’t count too much on the relationship, should the flow of funding cease. Buying loyalty works only so long as the checks arrive.
As to the widely admired, late King Hussain of Jordan, a Sunni monarch often considered a friend of the West and even of Israel, that good king sided with Iraq during the first Iraq war, to a very large extent because the majority of the residents of Jordan are Palestinians, who are Sunni, and the only way Hussain could keep Jordan together was to favor his belligerent neighbor. Abdullah, his son and heir, comes to the U.S., from time to time, in an effort to instill a little savvy into American policy toward the Muslim world, but so far seems to have had little impact, though he also achieves his other goal, financial support for his kingdom, which in 2008 comes to about $50 per Jordanian or $300,000. That certainly buys a modicum of friendship.
To continue: Socialist Gamal Abdul Nassar of Egypt was also a Sunni, but he was not seen as a friend of America, since he found the Soviet Union more amenable to his goals, but subsequent non-democratic Sunni presidents of Egypt have been seen as friends, especially when they shut the unfriendly-to-the-U.S. Sunni Muslim Brotherhood out of legitimate politics. So, these Egyptian Sunni, are they friends or enemies of the U.S.?
Whooops! I almost forgot the Palestinians. They are largely Sunni, which should make them our friends, except when they oppose Israeli occupation—or vote, in an honest election, for Hamas, in which case they become our enemies, especially when they turn toward Shia Iran for weapons with which to oppose Israeli oppression. The Bush administration thinks the Iran link is terrible. But, at worst, isn’t this Hamas-Iran axis a little like the U.S. befriending nasty dictators during the Cold War? When you need allies, you don’t ask embarrassing questions. On the West Bank, at least, we have real friends, under the hapless leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas, yet even Abbas was snubbed when Bush came to congratulate Israel on 60 years of independence, since that also means 60 years of displacement to Palestinians. Come to think of it, who in all of Palestine considers the U.S. an honest broker, let alone a friend these days?
What a confusing, mixed up business this is! Why can’t the Sunni just be clones of one another? The right kind of clones, of course.
On the other hand, maybe a certain homogenization is happening, which should not be at all comforting to the Bush administration, because the less U.S.-friendly have gained strength and influence, even in Indonesia. When it comes to aggressive missionary activity–and successful conversion, the prize-winners seem to have been the puritanical Sunni Salafists, whom the oil-wealthy Saudis have funded generously to preach their version of Islam globally. Anti-American books are distributed widely by the Saudi World Muslim League, free for the asking, courtesy of gas-guzzling American drivers. So, while the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. is welcomed as a courtesy uncle (even better than a friend) in the Bush family, his government is pushing a xenophobic, misogynistic Wahhabi form of Islam as the only authentic practice for the truly pious. Though Osama bin Laden is now persona non grata in Saudi Arabia, it’s not because he’s charged with misusing Islam to justify terrorism against kafirs. It’s because he considers the Saudi ruling family to be irreligious and thus unfit for rulership. And Al Qaeda of Iraq may or may not be controlled by the home office in Waziristan, but it’s members are definitely Sunni.
I conclude with a simple question: when columnist Thomas L. Friedman speaks of robustly supporting our Sunni friends and allies in the Middle East, who on earth can he be referring to? The king of tiny, ethnically split Jordan? A fragile government in ethnically-complex Lebanon? The nice, but powerless Abbas on the West Bank? A few Sunni emirs in the Persian Gulf whose oil-producing kingdoms contain more unprivileged foreigners (and Shi’a) than native-born Sunnis? A bunch of Iraqis in Anbar who are friends because we pay them to fight for instead of against us? Some friends! Some allies! Pretty thin reeds to tie a policy to.
Friedman ends his lament over Hezbolla’s increased power in Lebanon with a quote meant to suggest that the more Hezbolla appears to succeed the weaker it will be. To me, it seems as if the quote is more applicable to the Bush administration’s Middle Eastern policy:
Lebanon is not a place anyone can control without a consensus, without bringing everybody in,” said the Lebanese columnist Michael Young. “Lebanon has been a graveyard for people with grand projects.” In the Middle East, he added, your enemies always seem to “find a way of joining together and suddenly making things very difficult for you.”
Yup!
I may be the world’s worst person to write a review of “The Singing Revolution.” It’s a story I know well, having sought it out because it was so inspiring. So I know, not only how the story turns out, but also every step along the way. Shortly after Pat Kushlis and I met, we realized that we both wanted to write the same book: the history that this film recounts. The reason for that was that it seemed to contain so many lessons for the United States and other big countries that might be overimpressed with the power of their guns and tanks.
The Estonians were astute in their political judgements and their juggling of demonstrations and legislation through Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, which gave the Estonians the openings they needed to press forward, cautiously, relentlessly, toward reinstating their country’s independence.
Recent Comments