by CKR
President Bush summed up a strong American feeling: “I don’t do nuance.”
We like to think of ourselves as straightforward and honest. On top of that is a frosting of self-actualizing feelgood that says we can work it out if we come clean with each other.
That works, sometimes, in personal relationships, largely one to one.
Diplomacy and its rhetorical relatives (I’m using rhetorical in its positive/neutral sense) have been worked out for the more complex situations that attend life in a world of interlocking and conflicting personal relationships, like in the organizations we work for and the relationships of nations in the world.
We Americans also like to see ourselves as the good guys, as the cavalry riding through the middle of the bad guys, saving the day. That sometimes works, too, but difficult problems are more often solved by nibbling away at the margins. And, confusingly, sometimes it seems to be a combination of all of the above.
The Bush administration has gone far beyond these American leanings with its exhortational diplomacy: they know what they have to do. This, of course, puts other leaders in a box. They can continue doing what they are doing or look like they are bowing to US pressure, never a good way to maintain their position in the world or at home.
Diplomacy and its rhetorical relatives make room for changes of mind and heart. They avoid casting principle into concrete actions that cannot be altered if a better idea comes along. They set up win-win situations if possible. This can make diplomacy seem slippery and unprincipled to those whose preferences lie in those simpler realms and who lack imagination. Those who don’t do nuance.
Diplomacy has had a pretty good run this past few weeks, but it’s easy to lose sight of it in the sea of partisan rhetoric. North Korea and its five partners seem to be moving toward a nuclear settlement. Iran has said it will open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. Russia has suspended its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The last may or may not be good for world stability in the long run. It is, however, skillful use of diplomacy.
With North Korea, the situation has returned to more or less the Agreed Framework of 1994, with enhanced participation by regional powers. It is in all those powers’ interests to keep nuclear weapons out of North Korea. North Korea’s volatile rhetoric continued through the six-party talks, but it was not allowed to disrupt progress. Although the rhetoric may have seemed to undercut progress, North Korea’s previous compliance with the Agreed Framework indicated that it might comply now. Fuel oil was delivered to North Korea, North Korea shut down the reactor, and the IAEA inspectors have been allowed back. There are still some unfriendly words emanating from North Korea, but they are most likely for domestic consumption and North Korea’s version of face-saving.
Ambiguity is the environment of diplomacy, and pressing too hard to eliminate it is likely to undercut effectiveness. Playing to the internal audience is part of every government’s actions. We might even consider that this factor is what has damaged the US government’s diplomatic capabilities over the past six years.
Iran last week announced that it will allow IAEA inspectors access to its Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor. There is some indication that IAEA questions about Iranian activities that could be related to a nuclear weapons program may also be resolved.
We don’t know the internal calculations that have gone into this decision. Ali Larijani, Iran’s chief international nuclear negotiator, has been pressing for more cooperation on verifying Iran’s nuclear program. There are rumors that Iran is having technical troubles in making its centrifuges work. The economic sanctions may be pinching, with more discussion scheduled in the United Nations Security Council. Iran has changed its mind on IAEA access in the past. It has concealed what looks like weapons-related work and has remained secretive about these activities.
At the same time, Iran is warning against those further sanctions. Countries have to balance so as not to look weak. A concession is matched by a warning.
We are also hearing that the “attack Iran” faction of the US government is enjoying increased influence. The Guardian over the past couple of weeks has seemed to have a line to the more warlike members of the US government. Whether today’s report is reliable remains to be seen. I will note that we haven’t heard Condoleezza Rice say “They know what they have to do” for some time now. That could have something to do with making room for the Iranians to back down from their militant determination to keep the IAEA at bay. Or today’s report could be a face-saving measure on the part of the hawks in response to the possibility of US-Iran nuclear talks, mentioned almost in passing by Fars News.
Russia’s suspension of its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (summary) is even more complex. Since President Vladimir Putin first mentioned the possibility of suspension, he has been choosing his words and actions very carefully.
Although it was easy for the unnuanced American president to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, President Putin is playing his hand much more carefully. He has chosen the CFE treaty, which needs some updating. In contrast, the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty was abrupt, as was its announcement of a plan to station missile bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. Putin was quiet in response to the US withdrawal, perhaps thinking that there would be some compensating actions on the part of the US. But there were none, and the apparent refusal of the Bush administration to discuss such moves as those missile bases with anyone has exacerbated that situation.
Putin has chosen his action carefully as well. Although some media are hyperventilating about “withdrawal,” the word that the Russians have used, and insist they intend, is “suspension.” There’s an important difference there. The suspension goes into effect in 150 days, plenty of time for talks.
The words of the presidential decree list a number of problems with the CFE treaty in Russia’s eyes. All of these may be accurate, but it appears that the decree is partly in response to US actions, from withdrawal from the ABM treaty to the missile base plan to perceived general disrespect. Other reasons for the decree may include internal politics (Russia has an election next year, too) and a response to the irritations posed by the post-Soviet states in Europe.
President Putin reached out with an offer of a radar base in Azerbaijan to complement those in Europe. That offer was simultaneously a request for admission into the defending-against-Iran club and a test of whether the Polish and Czech bases might be intended against Russia. President Bush turned the offer down. A diplomatic reply would have been to study the possibility. A statesmanlike reply would have been to accept the offer.
Now we shall see if the past few weeks have taught the unnuanced one anything about diplomacy. The US State Department's Gordon Johndroe has issued a diplomatically neutral statement, a placeholder until a substantive response is decided. President Bush will meet today with President Lech Kaczynski of Poland to discuss the missile base in that country. We may hope that other subjects will be covered. The Polish president has seen fit to call Russia an “unpredictable country” in preparation for the visit.
A diplomat could soften the message, or even turn things around, with the appropriate communiqué from the meeting. It’s not to late to say that both presidents want to investigate the possible uses of that Azerbaijan base. Or that they agree with President Putin that it’s time to update the CFE treaty.