Drum-Thumping Heats Up

by CKR

Today's Los Angeles Times has an article that resembles one from earlier this week, I think in the Washington Post. Evidently that one didn't get enough attention, so the war-with-Iran machine needs to repeat it. It seems that unidentified "diplomats" believe that Iran is much closer to having nuclear weapons than anyone thought. (Could it be that the name of one of those diplomats is John Bolton?)

VIENNA — With efforts to halt its nuclear program at an impasse, Iran is moving faster than expected and is just days from making the first steps toward enriching uranium, said diplomats who have been briefed on the program.

Hmmm...yeah...let's parse that. I like to believe that the English language means something. How about a headline and lead like this:

Bush About to Declare Nuclear War

WASHINGTON - With Iran moving toward possession of the full nuclear fuel cycle, President George W. Bush is considering what to do about it. He is just minutes away from the possibility of opening that suitcase that always accompanies him and giving the properly coded command to send the missiles flying toward Iran's nuclear installations, said sources who know the command and control structure.

Equally true, equally accurate. But the LA Times didn't print the second. Nor did the WaPo.

So why did they print this?

With efforts to halt its nuclear program at an impasse

Not the first nor the last that an impasse will be reached in negotiations.

Iran is moving faster than expected and is just days from making the first steps

Pardon me, but I'd say that Iran already has made some "first steps" toward a nuclear program. They've acquired centrifuge designs, they've built a large building to house an enrichment operation, they've got auxiliary facilities. We don't know what's inside them for the most part because we don't have many intelligence assets beyond the satellite photos, but those look like first steps to me. When you add this in breathlessly

toward enriching uranium

it becomes a little more menacing. We (and the anonymous diplomats) still don't know what the Iranians want that enriched uranium for, but those pounding the drums think they know.

If engineers encounter no major technical problems, Iran could manufacture enough highly enriched uranium to build a bomb within three years, much more quickly than the common estimate of five to 10 years, the diplomats said.

My guess is that the anonymous diplomats have never been inside an enrichment facility, nor have they ever put together any precision equipment. So they are relying on the briefers, who are also...anonymous, but from the IAEA. I see no new technical information in this story, only assertions. The reporters, "staff writers," probably also lack that kind of experience, so they're relying (openly, they're honest about it) on the anonymous diplomats. How far away from the source before it becomes hearsay?

And look at this:

If engineers encounter no major technical problems

Give me an engineer who hasn't encountered technical problems (exactly what is the criterion for "major"?), and I'll give you a liar.

This article (and much of the coverage of what's going on in the Iranian nuclear program) is like one of those games of "Telephone," where grade-schoolers sit in a circle and whisper a message into each other's ears. The message gets pretty garbled when adults do it, too.

"We're getting conflicting signals from the United States; it now appears they want to escalate the situation," said a senior diplomat in Vienna. "The Russians see that as a slippery slope."

Officials said Iran was on the verge of feeding uranium gas into centrifuges, the first step toward enrichment. That move is in keeping with Iran's experience level and its previous statements, experts said.

Interesting juxtaposition. These two paragraphs actually have little to do with each other. I take the first to mean that the Russians are concerned that the US will take preventive action, as they did in Iraq. But that "slippery slope" designation bleeds into the next paragraph. Oooh, oooh: feeding uranium gas into centrifuges. That's that terrible first step! Scary, scary!

But what does "on the verge of" mean? I've been "on the verge of" doing experiments many, many times, and something has intervened. A valve doesn't work. It's prudent to go back and make sure that the gas is really what you think it is, and it turns out it isn't. A key person takes sick.

That last sentence

That move is in keeping with Iran's experience level and its previous statements, experts said.

is a no-brainer. If the staff writers had read previous articles, they could have concluded that, but it's more ominous and authoritative to indirect-quote the anonymous experts.

According to one non-Western official who closely follows Iran's progress, engineers at a pilot plant in Natanz are likely to start crucial testing in the next couple of days to ensure that the centrifuges and the pipes connecting them are properly vacuum sealed. They are likely to begin feeding uranium hexafluoride gas into a series of 164 connected centrifuges within about two weeks, the official said.

Another anonymous expert. That "crucial testing" (ooooh, oooh, crucial!) is that "on the verge of" stuff that usually has something that wasn't thought of or isn't the way it's supposed to be. They will find at least one leak that requires resealing. Trust me. I've used vacuum systems.

We seem to know that the Iranians currently have 164 centrifuges connected in a cascade, or some simalacrum thereof. I add the qualifier because there are reasons that one might not initially connect the centrifuges as they would be in an enrichment plant the first time around.

That number, 164, is important. The Iranians had more, but some of them broke. It's fairly easy to break a centrifuge. The rotor spins very, very rapidly, and it can fly apart if something doesn't work right. Think of a jet engine and then think of something much more delicate.

It's also important because the pilot plant, the article says, can hold six 164-centrifuge cascades. Have the Iranians manufactured or bought the additional 820 centrifuges? Where is the plant? How many can they turn out in a month? Not to mention the tens of thousands that will be needed for full-scale enrichment. No mention of that in the article.

Diplomats and experts say Iran has forgone usual testing periods for individual centrifuges and small series of linked centrifuges, instead apparently trying to put together as many as possible, as quickly as possible.

I've been in projects that tried this sort of approach. Sometimes it works.

And heeeerre's the slippery slope, from the single named source:

"If you can do one centrifuge, you can do 164," said Emyr Jones Parry, British envoy to the U.N. "If you can do 164, you probably can do many more. That means you have the potential to do full-scale enrichment. If you can do enrichment up to 7%, you can do 80%. If you can do 80%, you can produce a bomb."

Just like President Bush being minutes away from that suitcase. I guess if you work with words only, as diplomats do, this statement makes sense. But hard metal, bearings, seals, are even more resistant than words to being put together in the way you want.

The article finishes up by quoting David Albright and Gary Samore as saying something sort of like three years for Iran to get a bomb. Oh yeah, the words "best case" appear in those estimates.

I'm not saying that's not possible. I am saying that it takes time to do all this, much more time than it takes to write a newspaper article, with more things that can go wrong. And the "best case" is three years. That's a lot of time for negotiations, hardly the urgency implied by this article's headline and lead.

Cross-posted to Blue Force.