by CKR
As I noted a few weeks back, the Department of Energy budget proposes funding some work on reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Today Peter Baker and Dafna Linzer at the Washington Post take note of that budget item.
My previous post gives additional background. I'll add a few comments on the WaPo article. There are some little things, like the headline, that have a funny sound to them if you know the science, but I'll grit my teeth and try not to quibble.
Advocates use the word "recycling" to describe an advanced form of reprocessing that, instead of separating plutonium that can be used in bombs from spent fuel, would produce a mixed-oxide fuel too radioactive for terrorists to handle. Such fuel, called MOX, could be used in special reactors that exist in France but not in the United States.
It's hard to tell exactly what is being discussed here. One suggestion on reprocessing is to leave some of the fission products with the plutonium and uranium to make the fuel hard to handle. It's the fission products that are the "hottest" part of the spent fuel. Another suggestion is not to separate the plutonium and uranium, which would make using the fuel for a bomb more difficult. This seems to combine the two, which I suppose could be done, although there would be some severe downsides to it, not the least of which would be the greater potential for exposure of workers.
"We think they are putting a fig leaf on it by calling it proliferation-resistant and saying that it's not really reprocessing, so concerns about proliferation risks won't be valid," he said. "But if we develop something that we call proliferation-resistant and it really isn't, then other countries are going to claim rights to this technology. If it's really proliferation-resistant, would we let Iran have it?"
Well, that's really confusing. One of the ways to get fuel-cycle research funded is to call it proliferation-resistant. Usually this involves complexifying some part of the fuel cycle so that it's harder to get weapons-grade plutonium or uranium out. But any country that really wants nuclear weapons can get around the engineering fixes. And it would be a country, not a terrorist group. The technologies are too big and expensive for terrorist groups.
For safety, engineering fixes are usually preferable. Design a machine so it doesn't have exposed belts that can chop fingers off rather than put up a sign saying "Don't put your fingers in the belt." But proliferation depends so highly on motivation that engineering fixes are merely speed bumps on the way to getting a nuclear weapon for those who truly want one.
Two senior U.S. officials traveled last week to several countries, including Japan and Russia, to brief them about the initiative.
Russia would also like to provide nuclear services like reprocessing and enrichment to other countries. They have the equipement, and they'd like the money. They are likely to see the US as a competitor. Japan has also developed a lot of the technology, but they have moved toward reprocessing cautiously because of accidents in their nuclear programs and because of concerns about being seen to have a nuclear weapons capability.
The answer to limiting proliferation lies in international agreements. Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has proposed international centers for reprocessing and enrichment. I can't find a link to his proposal just now. I'll provide one when I can. In the meanwhile, there's this and this.