By PLS
A story from my time with USIS in Nigeria might serve to put the hyper-expensive, underhanded operations of the Pentagon-funded Lincoln group into perspective.
Old Africa hands will remember a particularly scurrilous bit of Soviet propaganda: the AIDs virus ravaging Africa wasn’t a naturally occurring mutation; it had been created by American scientists at Fort Dietrich.
This brilliant and very damaging bit of propaganda wasn’t easy to counteract in the mid 1980's. It built on an element of truth, the blight of racism that has never been completely extinguished in the US, and it fed into the panicky fear that quickly fatal AIDs elicited everywhere.
Something had to be done about the Ft. Dietrich story. We had to deny American involvement, of course, yet mere indignation isn’t terribly convincing. You know: “Methinks he doth protest too much.”
A barrage of facts would have killed off the Ft. Dietrich lies quickly, but facts were scarce then. AIDs research was in its infancy. No one knew how the virus had come into existence and no one had the slightest idea of how it might be cured. The science we had to offer was tenuous at best, which was very frustrating, and yet we made headway. Why? Because we had built a reputation for reliability. The material we circulated always advanced American interests, but it was also substantive and trustworthy. It appeared, properly attributed to USIS, on op-ed pages throughout Nigeria.
In Lagos, back then, USIS had an extremely active information program, thanks to my boss, who was not about to let the Soviets dominate the opinion pages of Nigeria’s two dozen or so English language dailies. Like all USIS posts, we were fed material for placement from Washington on a regular basis, but my boss had determined that we needed items tailored explicitly to the Nigerian context, so we hired, as normal USIS foreign national staffers, a couple of articulate Nigerians to write on themes we suggested. I’d edit their drafts, often substituting Nigerian locutions for the post-colonial Victorian English they favored, then distribute the pieces to our press contacts on the USIS press release stationary that was instantly recognizable to anyone who dealt with us.
We responded to every Soviet attack and then some. We wrote on history, economics, politics, labor relations, culture, international relations, colonialism, imperialism, you name it. One article I originated with pleasure was entitled “Speaking of (Soviet) Imperialism.” The notion of the Soviet Union as an empire was novel back then, and the article got widely placed. In fact, our overall placement record was terrific—and almost always the stories appeared with our writers’ by-lines and a note that USIS was the source. Whenever the USIS attribution was dropped, I called the editors and complained. We were doing information, not propaganda. We stood forthrightly behind our material and our methods.
Working in Nigeria as a USIS Information Officer counteracting Soviet disinformation, I made an astonishing but reassuring discovery: facts are powerful and truth trumps fiction rather easily. A quick consultation with researchers back in Washington would give us what we needed to set the record straight on the latest gross distortion of US history or policy. We’d generate an honest story in a lively style with a Nigerian angle and it would be published.
In fact, the Nigerian placement program was a variant of what USIA had been doing for years,. The Wireless File, so-called out of affection long after it was transmitted electronically, contained transcripts of important speeches by US officials, news items, book lists/reviews and (please note!) by-lined articles written by USIA employees or by other authors for a wide range of US or foreign periodicals from which the Agency had obtained republication rights (usually gratis). The WF came in several versions, one for each of the Agency’s geographic divisions, and it was a reliable tool for feeding America-friendly information to an infinite variety of opinion-shapers. Like the material we produced in Nigeria, the WF material was picked up and printed in reputable publications wherever USIS operated, which is to say, everywhere .
Public diplomacy during the USIA era had an amazing placement record, but the whole process depended on credibility. Our material was self-serving, of course, but it was reprinted by influential local publications because it was relevant and trustworthy. That respect rested on two pillars: facts-–and honest open attribution. Nothing phoney. Nothing hidden. We didn’t slip cash to editors or reporters. We didn’t conceal our authorship. It was that good.
Of course, we had nothing to hide in those days either.
Anothing thing: This extremely effective USIA information operation in Nigeria was an incredibly inexpensive, in-house operation. We were PD professionals. We knew the country we were working in. So no highly paid outside contractors were needed. And when we wanted to check something out with local leaders or opinion-makers, we didn’t have to pay for the information. We made an appointment and had a good chat---often a lively chat---over tea and biscuits. We got the feedback we needed and in the process made friends.