by CKR
Not too much punditry about the failure of the NPT conference. I suppose nobody really expected anything different. I’ve been a bit nervous that the Bush administration might take notice of the full name, Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, realize that it is a treaty and therefore decide to break it up. I’ve written some of my posts with trepidation that I may be saying too clearly that it is multilateral and, further, that it’s been doing what it’s intended to. Reason enough to withdraw for some.
But apparently even the anti-treaty unilateralists have realized that this treaty gives the US far more than it conflicts with their ideology and have contented themselves with repeated claims that the United States is doing its part; it’s those other guys that are the problem.
Stygius links to some of the better commentary. (Why was Joe Cirincione’s piece in the Khaleej Times rather than a major American outlet?)
PHK picked up a cute little disk on her trip to Washington. It’s the US press kit for the NPT conference. I do love technology.
Contents 1) Presidential Statement 2) eJournal USA: Today’s Nuclear Equation 3) eJournal USA: La ecuación de hoy 4) Article VI 5) Booklet on NPT Containing Text of Treaty 6) 2005 NPT Review Conference: Statement of US Objectives 7) Brochure on Article VI Produced by Department of Energy
Jeffrey Lewis and others found the eJournal on the internet. PHK tells us that it’s intended for distribution outside the US, but it appears that the State Department hasn’t yet figured out that placement on the internet makes it available everywhere. I’ve been wanting to review it, but not today.
If I were preparing a press kit, I’d put objectives somewhere near the top of the list, but they’re item 6. Here they are in toto.
NPT parties should recognize that enrichment and reprocessing technologies have been misused to support nuclear weapons programs. Restrictions on access to these technologies - but not to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for NPT compliant states - are needed to prevent new proliferation risks. Moreover, access to these technologies is not necessary to pursue a peaceful nuclear program. Reliable fuel supply is available for NPT parties that follow their nonproliferation commitments.Peaceful Nuclear Programs: NPT parties should recognize the linkage between pursuit of peaceful nuclear programs and adherence to the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations. We will continue to facilitate assistance to programs
in NPT parties that honor their Treaty obligations. NPT parties must prevent the Treaty from being used to hide a nuclear weapons program. NPT parties’ nuclear uses must comply with the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations. NPT parties that violate these obligations are not entitled to the benefits provided to those that honor their commitments. Enforcement action should be taken against violators, including a halt in nuclear supply. An NPT party has no basis to claim that the Treaty protects it from the consequences of its NPT violations, including the imposition of measures against its nuclear program.Disarmament: The United States has taken many steps, unilaterally, bilaterally with Russia, and multilaterally within NATO, that meet our Article VI obligations. U.S. deployed strategic nuclear warheads were around 10,000 in 1991. By 2001, the number had dropped to 6,000 and is headed for 1,700-2,200 by 2012 — an 80% reduction since 1991. Even more dramatic reductions of 90% have been made in U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO. It is indisputable that U.S. actions over the
past 15 years have established an excellent record of meeting our Article VI obligations.Conclusion: NPT parties should seize this important opportunity to work together to confront the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
Setting: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) plays a key role in global efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The United States remains strongly committed to the Treaty. The NPT faces a grave challenge due to violations of the treaty’s nonproliferation provisions by Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Libya. A widespread secret nuclear procurement network has also been exposed. While the Libyan and Iraqi threats have been eliminated, the North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs continue to threaten the NPT regime.
Compliance with the NPT’s Nonproliferation Obligations: The United States is committed to its NPT obligations and will seek support at the Conference for principles and policies to ensure the Treaty continues to advance global security. NPT parties’ security has been undermined by persistent violations by some states of the Treaty’s nonproliferation provisions. Unless we hold violators accountable, our collective security will deteriorate further.
NPT parties should pursue effective measures to reverse existing cases of noncompliance and prevent new ones. They should support ongoing efforts to convince Iran and North Korea to eliminate their nuclear weapons programs. NPT parties should demand strict compliance with the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations. As required, violations should be reported to the UN Security Council. NPT parties should have effective internal and export controls on nuclear-related items to ensure compliance with the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations and to keep their territories free of illegal activities. Security
Council resolution 1540 is an important tool in this regard. Its implementation will help to ensure that new technology networks do not spring up to take the place of the infamous Khan operation. NPT parties should also collaborate to stop illegal transfers through activities such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.NPT parties should recognize that the ban on the acquisition of nuclear weapons applies not only to an assembled weapon, but also can apply to a range of activities leading to assembly. Action should be taken if warning signs suggest an intent to acquire nuclear weapons, such as the secret pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The NPT’s IAEA safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol should be universally accepted, become the new safeguards standard and a key benchmark for transparency of peaceful nuclear programs, as well as a condition for nuclear supply. The IAEA Board of Governors should establish a Special Committee to enhance verification and enforcement of safeguards agreements.
They’re repetitive. Horribly repetitive. And incoherent. And you’ll notice that it’s someone else that’s supposed to be doing something. The United States doesn’t have to do anything beyond what it’s already done. Get that mote out of your eye!
The issues are legitimate. Stripped of the repetition, they are
It is possible to develop a civilian nuclear program that can be turned to weapons. Actions need to be taken to prevent a civilian nuclear program from being a cover for a weapons program.The US has decreased its numbers of deployed warheads.
Issues raised by the Iraqi, Libyan, North Korean, and Iranian nuclear programs, as well as the A. Q. Khan nuclear network must be addressed.
Stronger provisions are needed for accountability when violations of the NPT are uncovered.
The Proliferation Security Initiative can help to control proliferation.
The Additional Protocol should be accepted by all NPT signatories.
Safeguards and transparency of nuclear programs should be increased.
I’ve left out some of the subtleties, but they have to derive from the broader objectives.
There are some substantive problems with these objectives.
The first paragraph seems to say, as others in the administration have, that “good” nations should be allowed the full fuel cycle and “evil” nations should not. The NPT should apply to all equally. In any case, the “good” and “evil” orientations can change unpredictably.
The objectives ignore the recommendations of the 2000 Review Conference on compliance with Article VI, which requires nuclear and general disarmament. I’ll write more about Article VI in a later post.
The last paragraph turns itself inside out not to say that safeguards and transparency depend on IAEA inspections, but that’s what safeguards and transparency mean in the NPT context.
Frankly, I’d be embarrassed to have this go out over my name. It reads like an intern wrote it, but I still wouldn’t let it go out. I take my responsibilities as a mentor seriously.
For a list of objectives, it might be a good idea to state those objectives in boldface.
Nuclear weapons programs must not be conducted under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.Withdrawal from the NPT must have consequences.
Enforcement of NPT violations should be graded and predictable.
The Additional Protocol should be accepted by all NPT signatories.
Safeguards and transparency of nuclear programs should be increased.
That seems to me to be the essence of what’s there, although I admit I let my prejudices run away with me on the enforcement point.
Then sub-points would come under those heads. These could be examples of behavior that needs to be dealt with or specific ways the objectives might be met.
It would be better still to reference the report of the UN's High-Level Panel, which I've written about before, and which covers a number of these points.
According to some of Stygius’s links, John Bolton chose not to prepare for the NPT conference. The press kit looks like it.
More to come.