by CKR
The Bush administration is thinking about new nuclear weapons. The nuclear stockpile was designed for the needs of the Cold War. Most of the weapons are large, to take out missile silos and cities. Some are tightly designed and may be subject to deterioration. Both of these may be legitimate reasons for designing new weapons.
I’ve argued, as have others, that a few hundred nuclear weapons each are all that the US and Russia need in this post-Cold War world.
The Treaty of Moscow states that the United States will reduce its strategic nuclear weapons to 1700-2200 by December 31, 2012. Linton Brooks, the administrator of the DOE’s nuclear weapons agency testified to Congress on March 24, 2004, that while reduction to 2200 deployed warheads was possible, the number needed for backups and testing would be higher. Later, he said that the stockpile would be reduced by about half. That would leave 5000-6000 warheads in the US stockpile.
You might think that even this number leaves plenty of room for selecting the smaller and more robust warheads. A few hundred would allow disposal of the less robust and otherwise unsuitable. The question is, of course, in what circumstances the US forsees their use.
Even during the Cold War, many scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons were possible: massive nuclear exchanges against cities and missile bases, or stopping conventional forces in central Europe or the Middle East. In the 1991 Iraq war, the US threatened nuclear retaliation if Iraq used chemical weapons on the battlefield.
In an analysis of last year’s Nuclear Posture Review, James A. Russell, a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School says (bolding mine in all quotes)
The NPR implies that the defense of Israel represents a core mission for the strategic deterrent by identifying several near-term contingencies involving an attack on Israel that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. Moreover, with (as of this writing) two countries in the region (Syria and Iran) still supporting terrorism and possessing programs to develop WMD, the strategic force has two other potential targets. And, last but not least, the region seems implicitly highlighted by the NPR's treatment of the targeting problem posed by hardened and deeply buried targets that cannot be threatened by conventional weapons. As noted in the NPR, these targets necessitate a new family of munitions including low-yield nuclear weapons that may have to be fielded over the next decade. These munitions must be developed in part because of the characteristics of the strategic targeting problem in countries such as Iran and Syria.
Another direction for the nuclear forces seems to be rapid response:
The prospect of using the deterrent in short-notice operations also is strongly implied by the NPR's call to replace the cumbersome Single Integrated Operational Plan with something called "adaptive planning," in which components of the strategic nuclear forces can be integrated into responses to ongoing contingencies on reasonably short notice. Making the strategic arsenal more responsive in short-notice contingencies seems particularly applicable to potential counterforce strikes against WMD and leadership targets.
This is a big change from previous policy. SIOPs are cumbersome partly by design. Previous thinking has been that nuclear weapons should be used only after consultation at the very top of the government. “Adaptive planning” would require rapid consultation with the President and accurate transmission of information, or else some blanket permissions from the President beforehand. Blanket permissions are always dangerous, because the situation on the ground usually is different from what was foreseen.
Further, it is hard to envision a situation where conventional weapons could not wreak the desired damage, except for underground targets.
Russell’s article is long and meaty, well worth reading. He observes that communication between states is central to the strategy that derives from Thomas Schelling’s thinking. We know that communications between the US and Saddam Hussein included significant misunderstandings on both sides. In the scenarios that Russell considers, such misunderstandings could lead to an unwarranted nuclear war.
One of the targets Russell identifies is Syria. In February, Sam Johnson, Congressional Representative from Texas, twice gave speeches advocating nuclear attacks on Syria. Was he unwisely repeating something he had heard? And if so, from whom?
Equally worrisome, the 2005 National Defense Strategy contains a number of quotes that could be taken to include the use of nuclear weapons. Documents like this frequently state things in guarded ways, so as not to give anything away while saying enough that later it can be claimed that everyone was warned.
Here’s a typical two-sided quote (p. 2)
Experience in the war on terrorism has underscored the need for a changed defense establishment—one postured both for extended conflict and continuous transformation. This demands an adaptive strategy, predicated on creating and seizing opportunities and contending with challenges through an active, layered defense of the nation and its interests.
“[C]reating and seizing opportunities” to develop new weapons for new targets? How many and which layers to that defense?
Here are the other pieces of creative ambiguity that I found:
The danger of catastrophic violence dictates a new strategic imperative: we will actively confront—when possible, early and at safe distance—those who directly threaten us, employing all instruments of our national power. (p. 6)
When deterrence fails or efforts short of military action do not forestall gathering threats, the United States will employ military power, with other instruments of national power, as necessary, to defeat adversaries. In doing so, we will act with others as we can.In all cases, we will seek to seize the initiative and dictate the tempo, timing, and direction of military operations. Bringing military operations to a favorable conclusion demands the integration of military and non-military operations. When combined, these measures should limit adversaries’ options, deny them their means of support, defeat organized resistance, and establish security conditions conducive to a secure peace.
This strategy is intended to provide the President a broad range of options. These include preventive actions to deny an opponent the strategic initiative or preempt a devastating attack; combat operations against a capable and organized military, paramilitary, or insurgent adversary; and stability operations that could range from peace-keeping to substantial combat action. (p. 8)
“Include” should be read “include but not be restricted to.”
At the direction of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for future security. (p. 9)
Preventive actions also might entail other military operations—for example, to prevent the outbreak of hostilities or to help defend or restore a friendly government. Under the most dangerous and compelling circumstances, prevention might require the use of force to disable or destroy WMD in the possession of terrorists or others or to strike targets (e.g., terrorists) that directly threaten the United States or U.S. friends or other interests. (p. 10)
Comprehensive defeat of terrorist extremists and other irregular forces may require operations over long periods, and using many elements of national power; such operations may require changes to the way we train, equip, and employ our forces, particularly for fighting terrorists and insurgents and conducting stability operations. (pp. 14-15)
Further, recent experience highlights the need for a force capable of turning one of two “swift defeat” campaigns, if the President so decides, into an operation seeking more far-reaching objectives. Accomplishing these goals requires agile joint forces capable of rapidly foreclosing an adversary’s options, achieving decisive results in major combat actions, and setting the security conditions for enduring conflict resolution. We must plan for the latter to include extended stability operations involving substantial combat and requiring the rapid and sustained application of national and international capabilities spanning the elements of state power. (p. 17)
A prominent consideration in our global posture changes is to move our most rapidly deployable capabilities forward. For example, heavy forces will return to the United States, to be replaced in large part by more expeditionary capabilities such as airborne forces and Stryker brigades. As a result, our immediate response times should be greatly improved. (p. 20)
All of these bolded phrases from the National Defense Strategy could refer to nuclear strike capabilities. Yet, they could also refer to anything from soft power to economic sanctions. Does it represent a meaningful pattern?
Thanks to JJ for suggesting the topic.