by CKR
President Bush seems to be putting forth a new theory of the NPT: some nations can have the nuclear fuel cycle, some cannot.
David Sanger tries to put the pieces together today in an analysis piece in the New York Times. The center of Sanger’s piece appears to be this presidential statement. It’s a short statement, and Sanger quotes:
We cannot allow rogue states that violate their commitments and defy the international community to undermine the NPT's fundamental role in strengthening international security. We must therefore close the loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.
Taken with statements made recently by others in the administration, Sanger concludes that their direction is that Iran must give up its uranium enrichment capability. As I noted the other day, that capability is allowed to Iran under the NPT.
If Sanger’s analysis is correct, then President Bush has correctly identified a weakness in the NPT. Others have also identified this weakness, for example, the High-Level Panel in its report to Kofi Annan.
Despite the self-congratulatory words in President Bush’s statement
The United States remains firmly committed to its obligations under the NPT. Our record demonstrates this commitment, including the Moscow Treaty concluded in 2002. The United States will continue to play a leading role in strengthening the nonproliferation regime. We have undertaken concrete actions and made several proposals to strengthen the NPT, the IAEA, and the broader nonproliferation regime, including launching the Proliferation Security Initiative.
the report of the NPT Review in 2000 (pdf file, pp 14-15) gave 13 points that the nuclear weapon nations must address in order to live up to their NPT obligations. Currently the US is observing a moratorium on nuclear tests (point 2). I suspect that it may also be reporting on implementation of article VI (point 12), even though what it has to report is minimal. Point 9 gives pluses and minuses: The Moscow Treaty and recent statements by Linton Brooks, administrator of the NNSA, indicate movement toward more reductions in nuclear stockpiles (+), but the Moscow Treaty provides for no transparency at all (-). As far as a “diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies,” it might be argued that the Bush administration has read the first word in that quote as “increasing” (-) So if I’m generous in adding up the sub-points of point 9, the score is 1.5 out of 13.
Here’s an alternative I’ll recommend to President Bush for dealing with Iran:
Considering that civilian nuclear power has been used by one nation as a cover for development of nuclear weapons and that such a path is suspected in the case of at least one other nation,And that the nature of the nuclear fuel cycle is such that distinctions between a civilian nuclear power program cannot be made easily and clearly by inspections,
I therefore support the recommendation of the United Nations High-Level Panel that the enrichment and reprocessing functions of the nuclear fuel cycle be retained only in countries that currently have those functions. I further recommend that all such facilities be subject to continuing inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency in all their aspects, to determine that these facilities not be used to produce material for nuclear weapons.
To this end, I open the enrichment and reprocessing plants in the United States to such inspections immediately. I also pledge to work with the United Nations, other countries as appropriate, and the industrial firms involved to develop a plan for assured provision of such services at reasonable cost to civilian nuclear power programs in all countries.
Further, because several countries are in the process of building such facilities, I humbly submit these points in the United States’ compliance with the NPT as an example to encourage those countries to end their development of these facilities or to place them under international safeguards.
1. I will immediately submit the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to the United States Senate with my strongest recommendation for ratification.
2. I will submit to the Conference on Disarmament, within six months, a draft treaty on the cessation of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
3. I will recommend amendments to the Treaty of Moscow to extend that treaty to undeployed nuclear weapons, to provide for the continuation of verification similar to that of START I
4. I will begin negotiations with Russia on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons already removed from deployment under the Moscow Treaty and on the disposal of the resulting plutonium in such a way that it cannot be used in nuclear weapons in the future.
5. I will renew negotiations to complete and implement the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, Russia, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The ultimate objective of the United States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control
I am also sending a bill to Congress, with the strongest recommendation for passage, that the United States contribute a sum of $1 billion dollars to the International Atomic Energy Agency to improve its verification capabilities.
I urge the leaders of the other NPT nuclear weapon states to follow my lead. I further urge the leaders of Pakistan, India, and Israel to petition the United Nations Security Council to join the NPT as nuclear weapons states.
You can just copy this, George, Condi, John. You don’t even need to credit me.