by CKR
Kyrgyzstan reached a tipping point in the last few days. It may be worth considering how it got there and the many factors that contributed.
When the Soviet Union fell, some of the 15 republics were more than ready to go their own way, the Baltic States in particular. The Central Asian states came to independence reluctantly and were the last to declare it.
In Poland in 1980, the Solidarity organization developed the tactics we are seeing across some of the former Soviet republics and in Lebanon. Those tactics were refined in the Soviet republics during the late 1980s. Although the satellite countries and the Baltic States managed to move on to new governments, most of the former Soviet republics remained stuck in Soviet ways.
Georgia rapidly followed the Baltic moves, but corruption festered under Eduard Shevardnadze, a brilliant Foreign Minister under Gorbachev but a weak president. In Ukraine, corruption and disappearances apparently engineered by the secret police continued. Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan and Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan initially seemed to be relatively liberal, but their regimes became more corrupt and dictatorial. Elections in the twelve non-Baltic former Soviet republics have ranged from questionable to openly rigged.
The experience with democracy in the republics outside the Baltic States was minimal to nonexistent, as was experience in how to make a government into what the people wanted. The United States and Europe supplied training through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Soros Open Society Institute, Freedom House, and similar organizations.
The tactics being used now resemble those used in the Baltic States during the breakup of the Soviet Union. There are differences, but there are also differences in the situations. A question that has been raised is the degree of covert involvement by the US.
Such involvement seems to have been minimal in Poland and the Baltic States. Infiltration by US operatives, particularly in the Soviet republics, was difficult. In addition, Estonians were nationalistic enough to be resistant to help from their émigré community through their governments, although they eventually accepted it. Some émigrés, like Rein Taagepera and Mäido Kari, managed to get into the country before independence, but their influence was both public and limited.
The biggest demonstration for independence, The Baltic Way (also see here), involved perhaps two million people in a human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius. All the information I have indicates that people participated voluntarily, without payment, and were quite capable of handling the logistics as a result of having learned people-moving through the traditional song festivals.
US support for the independence movements was hesitant; under the first Bush administration, stability was valued, and the primary support was for Mikhail Gorbachev as a reformer, not for the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Later, Ukraine saw Solidarity/independence-type demonstrations over various issues, including the death of the journalist Grigory Gonganadze. Those demonstrations did not bear fruit in the form of governmental change until last fall, after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, a similar combination of public demonstrations. Earlier, Serbia saw similar actions.
Estonians and Serbians have been involved with the events in Ukraine and Georgia. I have not seen reports that they have been consulted by the Kyrgyzstanis.
There are many sufficient reasons for the people in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgystan, and Lebanon to demand governmental change. What would be an intelligent undercover strategy would be to provide support as a country moves toward a tipping point. Under unstable conditions, the effect of support would be magnified. But I have not seen anything in the reports (except perhaps for the plethora of flags and bunting) that suggests covert aid. There have been encouragements from the US Congress, but it is foolish to believe that such support is determinative.
That said, it remains possible that the CIA has supported demonstrations. In contrast to the first Bush administration’s preference for stability, regime change is today’s doctrine.
The dissatisfactions have been brewing for at least fifteen years in Kyrgyzstan and other countries. They are complicated by artificial boundaries, drawn to separate ethnic groups and make the republics less able to secede from the Soviet Union. Radical Islam is not a significant threat in Kyrgystan; the secularity of the Soviet Union diminished the influence of Islam, which was superficially imposed on Central Asian peoples.
However, Kyrgyzstan contains Uighurs, who have used their Islamic faith against Chinese nationalism in western China and are regarded with concern in Beijing. Other governments that must be looking on with concern include Kazakhstan, where Nursultan Nazarbayev has followed a path similar to Askar Akayev’s. In Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov has forcibly suppressed Islam and brought US military bases in. The Ferghana Valley, adjacent to Kyrgyzstan, has long been a seat of political ferment. Tajikistan is just as poor as Kyrgystan and shares many of its discontents. Turkmenistan and Belarus, for the moment, have dictators whose iron hands have managed to suppress dissent, but they must be looking at Kyrgyzstan with concern.
President Vladimir Putin of Russia has cause to be worried. The Commonwealth of Independent States has never been strong, and now it appears that more of Russia’s “near abroad” is coming undone. The specter of similar actions in Russia is not absent; such things happened during the nineties.
Thanks to JO for e-mailing an article that got me thinking.