by CKR
A group of nonproliferation experts gathered in Los Alamos during this past week. The meeting was sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Los Alamos Committee on Arms Control and International Security.
I’m not sure there was much news in the workshop; we had some very good discussions, which is important, but not what the media covet. The Washington Post came up with some of the speculations making the rounds at the workshop, and a quote from New Mexico's Senator Pete Domenici might have come from his speech to us. The meeting between Bush and Putin produced less than workshop participants were hoping for, apparently owing to the difficulties in negotiations the WP mentions.
With the NPT review conference coming up in May, there was agreement that three big issues that will probably be discussed are (1) non-nuclear weapon states can have a full nuclear fuel cycle, which can easily be turned to producing nuclear weapons; (2) the NPT contains no penalties for nations that flout it, like Iran, or withdraw, like North Korea; and (3) the perception that the nuclear weapons nations are not living up to their promise to decrease their nuclear arsenals. Also, three nuclear weapons states are outside the NPT: Israel, India, and Pakistan.
Some participants presented bold proposals, reflecting an undercurrent that only bold proposals can refresh commitment and break Cold War logjams.
Rose Goettemoeller, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that the time is ripe for the US and Russia to consider a more ambitious nonproliferation agenda. Look for an article coming out in the Washington Quarterly next week by her on the subject. For example, the Russians trained the North Korean nuclear scientists and built many of the North Korean facilities, so they know more about them than anybody else outside North Korea.Therefore, the Russians might lead the planning for shutdown of the facilities and for storing North Korean fuel in, say, Russia.
Joe Cirincione of Carnegie gave an overview of the findings of their major report, “Universal Compliance,” which will be on the Carnegie website next week and which I’ll comment on later.
David Hafemeister, emeritus professor of physics at California Polytechnic University, suggested that the US Senate might be encouraged to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in return for an addendum specifying penalties (sanctions, for example) against violators. Hafemeister also feels that recent technical advances in detecting nuclear tests have changed the situation fundamentally since the Senate refused to ratify the CTBT in 1999.
Ratifying the CTBT is one of the thirteen points that the 2000 NPT review conference said must be addressed to meet the requirements of the nuclear weapon states to move toward disarmament (Article VI). One of the more bizarre findings by the Pew research organization during the US’s election campaign was that supporters of George Bush believed that he was in favor of the CTBT. If he were, of course, he would use some of his vaunted “political capital” to get it ratified.
As I review my notes, I see many gems. I’ll incorporate them into later posts.
Many thanks to the Los Alamos National Laboratory for being willing to work with an NGO on this, particularly to my colleagues on the organizing committee. And thanks to all the participants for great discussions.