By Patricia Lee Sharpe
Last Friday, just before Pakistan’s army finally moved into South Waziristan, an American friend asked me, “What are we going to do about Pakistan?”
This was my reply: “What are we going to do? Nothing rash, I hope. It’s Pakistan’s war.”
And that would still be my reply. The army moved into South Waziristan with a force of about 33,000, a fairly modest contingent, considering the fact that Pakistan has an army of about 500,000 on active duty and an equal number of reserves. This means that most troops are still guarding the border with India. It also means that heavy reinforcements are theoretically available.
A Serious, Well-Supported Effort
However, this unexpectedly small force is probably not an indication of the half-heartedness with which previous forays into the tribal areas were launched. Those attempts to squelch assorted militant Islamists relied heavily on the frontier militias, which have neither the training nor the equipment to wage war in earnest. In addition, Pakistan was not then willing to take many casualties. When the going got tough, government forces were pulled out.
This time the war is for real, the stakes are high, and the Pakistani population, by and large, strongly support the move, as was not the case with earlier efforts. Even six months ago, neither the army nor the people were ready for costly all-out war against any Taliban elements. Compromise, conciliation, containment—these were the preferred approaches to militant Islam: stay on your side of the line and we’ll leave you alone. Besides, the war against terrorism was seen as an American priority rudely foisted on Pakistan, and Pakistanis have a less than wholehearted love for the U.S.
Taliban Miscalculations
Then came Swat, where the deal broke down. First of all, the Taliban, metaphorically drunk on success, got too brutal too soon in an area that the generality of Pakistanis consider far less alien than the “backward” Federally Administered Tribal Areas which have long been left more or less to themselves. Then they began pushing out of Swat into contiguous areas, closer and closer to Islamabad, which meant—Wow!—they’re coming for us, too! Result: Pakistanis supported the Army offensive in Swat, not for America’s sake, but for their own. At this point, the Taliban might have made the best of a beating. They might have retreated North to more sympathetic areas. Instead they misread the tea leaves. They retaliated with a vengence, launching a bloody bombing campaign in every corner of the country, hoping to frighten Pakistanis into accepting the inevitably of a Taliban takeover. Chest-thumping interviews with Taliban leaders reinforced the fear campaign. As a result, a number of foreign observers have begun to predict the imminent disintegration of Pakistan.
On the contrary. Taliban brashness has galvanized the Army and the population. One hopes that the interminable delay in finally launching the operation in South Waziristan was caused by the determination to plan very carefully how to approach a very tough enemy who is going to be fighting for survival in very challenging terrain. To accomplish this mission the Pakistani Army is going to need time. The campaign is officially scheduled to last two months, but it took longer than that to make the much smaller Swat valley safe enough for people to consider returning home. Furthermore, the army and Pakistani society are also going to have to be willing to accept heavy casualties. Fortunately, the delay caused by deliberation allowed tens of thousands to flee the anticipated battle zone, which will mitigate non-combatant casualties in this lightly populated area.
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