by Cheryl Rofer
The role the public should play in developing nuclear weapons policy came up many times during last week’s workshop and provoked its most heated exchange: whether the public was qualified to have a voice in that policy.
My position has been that we need more public involvement. While most people may not have throw weights and the details of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at their fingertips, they have a general idea of the world-destroying risks of nuclear weapons, and, since they are part of that world, should get a say. That’s why I called our two blog-tanks on nuclear weapons.
It seems to me that there is a balance between the specialized knowledge of academics and think-tankers and what is needed for policy, and that the specialized knowledge can be a bar to taking a broader view of what kind of world people want to live in. Helmut addressed this question much more thoroughly than any non-philosopher could. So I’ll direct you to his post. I’ve read academic books on nuclear weapons strategy and policy that are almost incomprehensible and seem to be intended for an audience of the other three guys who specialize in that sub-sub-subfield. And of course, we bloggers are acquainted with the Very Special Person phenomenon, in which one of those VSPs with all that expertise makes a statement that bloggers would be embarrassed to claim as our own.
At last week’s workshop, the comment was made several times that the field of study of nuclear weaponry is declining. The numbers of academics are decreasing, and the people who are left keep running into each other at the various workshops and conferences. New ideas are very much needed in our no-longer-two-player world, and fewer people talking to each other are unlikely to come up with those new ideas. Another reason for the blog-tanks, which, I think, were moderately successful on this front.
But a case was also made for damping down the public discussion.
Nuclear weapons are not one of the public’s top ten issues. Maybe not even top twenty, somewhere in the top 100. There are a number of reasons for this, some quite obvious in this week’s news. There’s the yuck factor, which applies to thinking about the various ways one might die in a nuclear attack. And some are intimidated by the technical aspects of nuclear weapons, not realizing that their political views require relatively little technical backing. Further, since 1991, our big nuclear enemy is no more. Recent events raise suspicions about Russia, but we know and they know that nuclear war isn’t anywhere close, unless by accident.
Last week’s argument was put more strongly: a national dialog will generate public fears, and the mere suggestion of a Cold War redux would generate public hostility. Ballistic missile defense provides an insurance policy against other nations’ doing something provocative or stupid. Rhetorically, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea would bludgeon the US if the government opened such a discussion. So it is better to let sleeping dogs lie; the government should go ahead with its nuclear policy without much discussion. Less talk about nuclear weapons is a kind of downplaying of their prestige.
I have, at times, had misgivings about trying to stoke up a discussion, and, as I listened to this argument, I though it summed up some of those misgivings. But now, as I write it up from my notes, it seems much less persuasive.
The effectiveness of ballistic missile defense is highly questionable; recent attempts at deployment have in fact stirred up fears of nuclear war, although the discussion has been muddled. A national discussion of nuclear weapons policy would indeed reactivate some fears, but isn’t the basis for those fears that we should be talking about?
It seems to me that this argument assumes that a discussion led by the government would be on increasing or augmenting our nuclear arsenal. If the government were to advocate moving toward lower numbers and decreasing nuclear dangers (like taking missiles off alert), the response among the public and the world would be largely positive. And, indeed, the numbers are going down, so making this clear with those numbers that no longer need to be classified, a point also made at the workshop, could be a start.
So I’m sticking by my, er, guns. We need to hear from the public on nuclear weapons policy. And, a number of participants agreed, we need more information from the government on numbers of nuclear weapons and the fate of the disassembled parts. Not right now, but I hope the next president and congress are willing to enlist the rest of us in what’s going on.
And I’ll continue to look for ways to encourage the discussion, with or without them.
