Blog Tank: National Strategy for a Few Nuclear Weapons – Why They Want Them

by Cheryl Rofer

We have eight blog contributions, with a number of helpful comments. They are all linked in the comments to the first post in this series. I haven’t had a grand plan for this blog tank, like I did for the last one. I think I’ll follow Michael Levi’s method in On Nuclear Terrorism and take one element of the potential actions at a time.

For this post, I’ll consider why the countries addressed by our contributors want those few nuclear weapons.

The press release from Oz says

The Kind and Benevolent Wizard is content that the world will see us for our goodness, and not think ill that we should use this technological capability for the assured preservation of Oz and its ideals.

Internal documents obtained by this blogger are somewhat consistent with the press release.

Since it has become known to The Great and Wonderful Wizard that nefarious forces in the lands of ZenPundit are "contemplating how to leverage the possession of a small number of nuclear weapons to best advantage," we will develop our own strategy in the interest of global peace and tranquility.

Jimbo’s “invasion spoilers” might be one way for Oz to use its nukes.

Eddie’s Iraqi Kurdistan suddenly emerged as a nuclear power after the carnage of the Iraqi-Israeli war. Details of its deliberations are not yet available, but it appears that the nuclear capability furnishes an unassailable platform for Kurdish unity and independence.

Eddie’s insurgents in the Nigerian Delta are also seeking independence, with urging by outside powers. Those outside powers would like to seize control of the Delta’s oil and are using the insurgents as a cat’s paw.

The Armchair Generalist as the ruler of a small country with limited resources:

There would be a few starting points - I'm not stupid enough to think that the few nuclear missiles I build could be a deterrent to a major superpower. If I can't ensure overwhelming devastation to multiple cities of said superpowers, then MAD theory doesn't apply. Building a nuke just for "national pride" is a secondary objective. If I have a few nukes, it will be to deter an adversarial nation who can't stop eyeing my land. Or maybe he keeps having "national military exercises" that stop at my borders. Damn so-and-so ...

Arherring posits the acquisition of ready-made nukes by a small country or other force, instead of developing the infrastructure to manufacture them. He gives four possible motivations:

1) The Outpost of Tyranny #7: … a country with an authoritarian regime that wants to make waves with the big players, yet doesn’t want to be paid a visit by the Leviathan and will use these weapons to prevent that possibility.

2) The Independence movement: A country or organization that desires to set itself apart … from the government that currently rules it. They want to change the map and they want to ensure that the change is permanent.

3) The Prince among the Paupers: Several countries around the world are making a concerted effort to [improve their situation, but their] neighbors only seem to export unrest and deter foreign investment. Worse they quite often become the fourth type of player.

4) The Covetous Neighbor: These are countries, mired in third-world status, that see more prosperous and resource rich neighbors around them. Should they acquire the means, how could they acquire those resources, and how would they prevent the world for stopping them?

ZenPundit takes a more general approach:

But for a certain class of nation-states, possession of nuclear weapons, even a crude handful, remains a worthwhile expenditure even at the cost of great national sacrifice... These states value nuclear weapons because, simply, they desire to be independent powers at the least and dominating hegemons of their neighborhoods if possible.

Soob suggests four motivations: deterrence, extortion, “hostage-taking”, and nuclear attack by proxy. I’ve always had a hard time understanding nuclear blackmail, a phrase that easily trips off many people’s tongues, but not necessarily with any meaning I can discern. Soob suggests that the shipment of food and fuel to North Korea and Japan constitutes nuclear extortion. North Korea’s hostages could be South Korea and Japan in a negotation with the United States.

Fabius Maximus’s Amaria (some of that description seems familiar!) is in trouble in multiple ways, and the international community is threatening to deal with those troubles forcibly. Amaria badly needs a deterrent.

Fester suggests a sort of national suicide strategy: you invade, and we’ll blow ourselves up. He calls this “the internal sabotage deterrent.” He also points out that those first 1-5 nukes may be the placeholders until numbers 6 and higher can be manufactured.

So deterrence is the big motivator, both to neighbors who may be unfriendly in various ways and to the big nuclear players. That deterrence can take the form of threatening to blow oneself or the neighbors up. Independence movements would value nuclear weapons as a show of power and, again, deterrence against various forms of interference with their ambitions. National pride is secondary, but not to be ignored. Assuring the world that the nuclear weapons are for peaceful purposes will be useful in some cases, but not all, I think. It would be hard for a separatist movement with a nuclear weapon to convince anyone their motives were purely peaceful. Subterfuges like quiet shipment to an attacker’s port and handing a nuke off to another group are possible. And, of course, the small arsenal may be the way station to a larger one.

Any other insights from this collection of motivations? Corrections? Additions?

I think that I’ll tackle the reasons not to acquire that small arsenal next.

Comments

[Andy]

Two quick thoughts:

1-5 weapons are simply a stepping-stone to a bigger arsenal. Alternatively, a nation may only build 1-5 weapons, but claim to have many more, thereby getting whatever benefits might be had from a larger stockpile at reduced cost.

Secondly, a primary motivator for building a small nuclear arsenal is because you believe that is what your enemy or neighbor is doing. See Brazil/Argentina, Iraq/Iran, Pakistan/India.

[Arherring]

I think an important consideration from the deterrence aspect is that with an arsenal this small, even more than with massive arsenals of a classic MAD scenario, these are weapons for the having, not for the using. With an arsenal this small used in a first-strike capacity, the remaining weapons lose most, if not all, of their strategic utility. Retaliation would be too swift and too complete, a MAD scenario of a different kind.

[Bryan Alexander]

At a meta-level, this is a fascinating example of blogs for intellectual exchange. How did this turn out for your purposes, Cheryl?

[Cheryl Rofer]

We're not finished yet, Bryan, so I don't want to try an evaluation yet. I plan at least one more post, which will take me another day or so.