Why Now? (Some of) The Politics of the Al Kibar Revelations

by CKR

Why now? Let’s see what the Senior Administration Official had to say about this (emphasis added):

Our first concern was to prevent conflict and perhaps an even broader confrontation in the Middle East region. We were concerned that if knowledge of the existence and then destruction of the reactor became public and was confirmed by sources that the information would spread quickly and Syria would feel great pressure to retaliate. And, obviously, that would have been a threat to Israel and risked the possibility of a broader regional confrontation which we hoped to avoid. As time has passed, our assessment is that that risk has receded. We have an obligation to keep Congress informed with matters such as this. We had briefed 22 members of Congress in positions of leadership and chairs and ranking members of key committees last September and October. We wanted and Congress wanted us to brief more widely within Congress. We also felt that we could – and we also felt that we could use public disclosure to advance a number of policy objectives. So the calculation was the risks of greater discussion and disclosure had declined and were now acceptable and that, for a number of reasons, timing was good now to advance some policy objectives

We are at the point in the – for example, first let me take North Korea. We are at the point in the Six-Party talks where we believe going public will strengthen our negotiators as they try to get an accurate accounting of North Korea’s nuclear programs. We believe and hope that it will encourage North Korea to acknowledge its proliferation activity, but also to provide a more complete and accurate disclosure of their plutonium activities and their enrichment activities as well.

With respect to Iran, the Syrian episode reminds us of the ability of states to obtain nuclear capability covertly and how destabilizing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would be. And obviously everyone is concerned about that with respect to Iran, and we hope that disclosure will underscore that the international community needs to rededicate itself to ending Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities, and needs to take further steps to ensure that Iran does not obtain nuclear weapons. And countries can start by the full implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions already dealing with Iranian nuclear activities, which are not being implemented as aggressively and fully as they should.

Finally, with respect to Syria, at the present time there are major initiatives underway to advance the cause of freedom and peace in the Middle East: There are talks between Israelis and Palestinians; there is progress in building a stable and democratic Iraq; there are efforts in Lebanon to consolidate its sovereignty after a long period of foreign occupation. Actions by the Syrian regime threaten progress along each of these tracks. Disclosure of Syria’s nuclear activities, we hope, will help us in convincing other nations to join us in pressuring Syria to change its policies.

That’s all pretty clear. I’d like to focus on the last of the reasons.

What was left out by the briefer was the fact that Israel and Syria appear to be willing to discuss the Golan Heights, which were taken by Israel from Syria during the 1967 Three-Day War. Syria would like the area returned.

According to Arab News, President Ehud Olmert of Israel put out peace feelers to President Bashar Assad of Syria. Turkish diplomats have been acting as intermediaries between the two for the past year. The announcement of this progress came almost simultaneously with the release of the CIA video purporting to show the reactor in the Syrian desert that Israel bombed.

Yoel Marcus is cautiously optimistic in Haaretz:

A peace agreement with Syria is the kind of thing that Israeli leaders need to examine under a microscope. It must include evicting Palestinian terror chiefs from Syria, an end to arming Hezbollah and, most importantly, severing strategic ties with Iran.

There is nothing that could create a more positive change in the Middle East than a peace accord between Israel and Syria. If Assad understands what is required of him, and he really wants it, that is stronger than any Israeli leader afraid that concessions on the Golan Heights will be rejected by the Knesset opposition or Israeli public opinion.

Go for it, Olmert.

Elias Harfoush is less optimistic in Dar al-Hayat, a regional Arab newspaper, for the very reason of the release of the CIA video.

The talks seem to be moving briskly. Issues being discussed are as specific as whether a Syrian announcement of ending support for terrorism needs to precede an Israeli guarantee that it will withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace.

Ehud Barak has delayed a planned trip to the United States because of the CIA briefing, so as to avoid the impression that the two are connected.

Meanwhile, Israel’s right wing is loudly protesting any thought of giving up the Golan Heights. Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party has attacked President Olmert’s willingness to participate in talks, and other voices cite the CIA briefing as reason not to trust Syria.

Syria is “not afraid to cooperate with the IAEA”, according to Bashar Ja'afari, Syria’s ambassador to the UN. He did not say that Syria would allow the site to be inspected, however.

Look again at that statement by the Senior Administration Official: Syria must be pressured into being a good neighbor; it does nothing but make trouble. Was the CIA briefing an attempt to maintain that image of Syria when the administration knew the news of the Golan Heights talks would soon emerge? And was it an attempt to derail those talks?

Comments

[James]

I guess it is pretty interesting that the briefer would leave out something that's been reported in the press. Especially keen to only say bad things about Syria. I also don't see how going public advances the cause of Israeli-Syrian peace. Finally, I don't see how the Syrian government, which has always been fundamentally rational, if evil, could give in to "pressure to retaliate" against an enemy that has them so heavily outgunned.

Since the talks have been going on for over a year, is it possible that Israel chose not to discuss the raid in September for fear of upsetting the negotiations? And is it possible that this was the reason for their objections to the briefing last week?

Quoting Daniel Levy at TalkingPointsMemo:

"This is one more demonstration that the neocons who pushed for this have their own agenda--and to the extent to which it dovetails an Israeli agenda--it is the agenda of the opposition on Israel's far-right and has nothing to do with actual Israeli security interests (or any logical reading of American interests for that matter)."

[Charles]

Their claim is that they briefed the Congress now in order to pressure North Korea, Iran, and our allies. Yet they had a statutory duty to brief the Congress much earlier.

When people have to explain their actions in this much detail, it's a pretty sure bet the explanation doesn't match the underlying reality.