The Bloggers Develop Nuclear Weapons Policy – The Consensus Statement

by CKR

Previous posts in this series:

Innovative Ideas

Preliminary Summary

Challenge

I’m going to make this compact, and I’m not going to attribute. I’ve done quite a bit of reading between the lines and have supplied my own wording in many places. For those who’ve contributed, consider whether you can live with this. It won’t agree with every point everyone has made, but that’s the nature of consensus.

As usual, feel free to come up with a post of your own, or comment on what I’ve done.

Overview
The bloggers who have contributed to this blog-tank range in views across the center of the political and hawkishness spectra. Nonetheless, we have achieved a fair degree of consensus.

Nuclear weapons strategy is part of a broader US military and international relations strategy, but it can be discussed by itself. To some degree, development of all these levels of strategy is iterative.

We need to identify short-term and long-term goals and give each its appropriate place. While abolition of nuclear weapons may be a long-term goal, making it too immediate can be counterproductive.

Nuclear weapons have a paradoxical relationship to power. They cannot be used, but their threat is potent. If a nation is tied too closely to a requirement to retaliate, its options may in fact be limited.

Nations that have nuclear weapons want to preserve their exclusivity, but that desire may increase the valuation of nuclear weapons by other nations.

The Threat
The threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) via the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union is no more. But the United States must consider the nuclear arsenals of Russia, China and others. It cannot unilaterally disarm. The greatest nuclear threats now are accidents from, for instance, the thousands of missiles in the United States and Russia still on Cold-War alert status or from poor handling of nuclear weapons, as in the recent inadvertent transport of nuclear-armed cruise missiles from North Dakota to Louisiana.

The other current threat is from terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons. This is most likely to come from theft from current stockpiles.

Deterrence
With the Soviet Union gone, MAD is no longer operative. Whether it can be applied to today’s world is not clear. Pakistan and India have achieved a nuclear standoff that resembles MAD. Even a single nuclear explosion is a serious threat to the economic and social stability of larger nations like the United States, Russia and China. A hundred strikes would be devastating; fewer would destroy most nations.

Overwhelming conventional military power, particularly air power, may deter as effectively as nuclear firepower; perhaps more effectively because of the conventional-psychological barrier to the use of nuclear weapons.

Multipolar nuclear deterrence may result in the valuing of nuclear weapons by smaller states; possession of nuclear weapons may seem to them a way to counter the overwhelming conventional military power of larger states.

Nuclear weapons are no stronger a deterrent than conventional weapons to stateless groups like al-Qaeda that have no land or population to protect. Neither is persuasive.

For any deterrent to work, the tripwires and penalties must be clear. That is not now the case with US nuclear weapons policy.

First Use and Transparency
Nuclear weapons are different from all other weapons, including those that are sometimes called “weapons of mass destruction.” Therefore, there is no such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon, to be deployed into the field along with other weapons. Any first use will evoke strong international reaction, particularly if that first use is by the only country to have used nuclear weapons in war.

Thus, it should be the policy of the US that nuclear weapons are intended solely to deter and respond to a nuclear attack. They should not be a response to a chemical or biological attack by non nuclear weapon states, but to a nuclear attack only. In the event of a terrorist nuclear attack, nuclear retaliation may be exactly what the terrorists hope to provoke.

US responses to a nuclear attack should be clear. Further, our nuclear ally, Israel, needs to be more forthright about its nuclear possession and policies.

Dissuasion
The pursuit of nuclear weapons can be discouraged by increasing the costs (economic and otherwise) of their development, the hazards of their development, and the value of developing them. Governments and international organizations must continue to maintain the position that nuclear weapons are not part of ordinary military planning. Attempting to ‘domesticate’ them or produce low-yield ‘usable nukes’ will tend to undermine the marginalization of nuclear weapons that is essential to maintaining nonproliferation.

Immunizing non-nuclear states against nuclear attack under all circumstances gives them a strong positive reason to avoid pursuing nuclear weapons and to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

Negotiations
Negotiations to decrease the numbers of nuclear weapons from the present 26,000 or so down to the low thousands or less should continue between the United States and Russia. Verification is important and should be a part of any agreements coming out of these negotiations. It is also important to bring the other states having nuclear weapons into these talks to decrease their stockpiles as well.

Additional subjects for which negotiation is essential is the safety and security of nuclear stockpiles and nuclear materials; delivery vehicles, which are easier to see and count than nuclear warheads; and the current alert status of missiles. All of these negotiations should be multilateral. Cooperation between the United States and Russia on securing nuclear materials should continue and be expanded.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Beyond
The NPT is an important part of keeping nuclear weapons under control. The IAEA has been successful and will need to be expanded as additional facilities are opened up to inspection and as restrictions on the numbers of nuclear weapons are increased. Additional duties may also be given to the IAEA or other international organizations, including buying up black market nuclear materials and the development of an international fuel bank.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be ratified by the Senate.

Infrastructure
The infrastructure of nuclear weapons laboratories and production facilities is an important part of the US’s deterrent. As numbers of nuclear weapons in the stockpile decreases, the ability to rebuild becomes more important. However, immediate development of the Robust Replacement Warhead (RRW) will send the wrong message to the world about the US’s commitment to the NPT. The nuclear weapons complex must be sized in accordance with strategic needs in this area.

At the same time, defense-industry lobbying, profiteering, and the privatization of conflict need to be reined in.

Missile Defense
Along with infrastructure, missile defense is part of the “New Triad.” We have come to no consensus on missile defense. It is a large enough subject that perhaps another blog-tank on the subject is in order.

Regional Security
Regional security should be pursued through agreements of protection under the US nuclear ‘umbrella’, sponsorship of regional military/economic agreements, and expansion of programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction effort beyond the former Soviet Union. All of this requires the US government engage both allies and potential adversaries on an international, not unilateral, stage.

Comments

[zenpundit]

Superb job, Cheryl. Thank you for being the leader on this issue.

[marc anizan]

First-rate. Thanks.

[deichmans]

Cheryl,

First, some housekeeping: the links to "Consensus" from your older posts point to the mid-December post, not to this Jan. 8th one.

Overall, a nice, concise summary. Two concerns that I have are [1] insufficient emphasis on stockpile management as an important element in reducing arsenal sizes (it is only mentioned under "Negotiations" in the context of U.S.-Russia cooperation), and [2] the paradox under "Infrastructure" of both acknowledging the ability to rebuild while demonizing the Reliable Replacement Warhead program.

While RRW was zeroed in the recent Congressional appropriation, there is still a very real need in the weapons complex to right-size the infrastructure (facilities as well as personnel) in a manner that is affordable and appropriate for the 21st century. I do not believe we can count on having ready access to thousands of master tradesmen and women in the coming decades, and therefore must continue to conduct research and development into new systems -- in compliance with current treaty obligations -- that enhance reliability, verifiability and sustainability.

[CKR]

Links are fixed. Thanks, Deichmans.

I'll just remind you that a consensus statement won't satisfy everyone. As the compiler, I'd rather not comment on substance just now. Maybe later. My next post in this series will be my evaluation of the process.

And thanks to the others for the kind words.

More comments from ZenPundit here.

[J.]

I'll chime in and say that this is a marvelous and coherent summary of the discussion. This could easily represent an outline of a much more in-depth discussion of the US nuclear weapons policy. Hopefully someone out there in a think tank will take it up.

[Cernig]

Great work, Cheryl. You conceived, directed and drove this project. Give yourself a well-deserved pat on the back.

Regards, C

[Phila]

You can add me to the list of people who think you've done a tremendous job here, and I'd also like to thank you again for inviting me to participate.

I'm mildly shocked to find that I really don't disagree with a single thing you've said here. Given the political and professional differences between the contributors, this is very encouraging.

[Kingdaddy]

OK, it's late, but I started adding a few words on the topic.

[Eric Martin]

Also, kudos. Fine, fine job.