The Bloggers Develop US Nuclear Policy

by CKR

Mark has joined the discussion of US nuclear policy (my latest contribution, Cernig’s). It seems to me that what is important about this discussion is how much we agree despite different political views. The broad outlines of a desirable nuclear policy for the post-Cold-War world seem fairly obvious, even though the VSPs are having some trouble figuring it out.

If Mark, Cernig and I can come up with so many points that we agree on, perhaps our legislators could do the same. If they want to begin to work across the aisle, this is hardly the worst place to start. Nuclear destruction, after all, is equal political opportunity.

For this quick vacation post (I do apologize for not keeping the discussion rolling faster), I’ll group Mark’s requirements a bit differently than he did and add minimal summing-up and comments. I also hope to have a more comprehensive post on a new nuclear policy, something like what I’ve been promising for some time now, maybe next week. Mark and some of the commenters at Newshoggers have reminded me of points that I’ve been neglecting.

Component and Materials Control

* The need for more effective controls and tracking of trade in esoteric, dual-use, technologies of weaponization that make nuclear devices useful militarily. Increasing transparency level of same.

* International nuclear convention regarding the security of nuclear materials and command and control by the nuclear weapons states.

* Removal of strategic nuclear materials from the global black market by vastly accelerating certified destruction or reprocessing of obsolete national stocks.

* Strengthening and expanding the inspections regime under which NPT signatories are permitted access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Addition of automatic penalties if NPT signatories are caught cheating, subject to removal or waiver by the UNSC ( putting the burden on the accused proliferator to come clean instead of on the IAEA or UNSC states to get any meaningful sanctions applied).

Short version: Control fissionable materials and weaponization components by physical means and by treaty. Strengthen the NPT regime.

Comment: “Putting the burden on the accused proliferator to come clean” is difficult, but a goal worth considering. Probably the ongoing interactions with North Korea are the best we’re likely to get: multilateral interventions using a mixture of carrots and sticks. I’m not sure what the automatic penalties could be.

General Security Measures

* Identifying and categorizing non-state network threats to American security with potential WMD capacity.

* Understanding the parameters of the possible in terms of private networks and WMD capabilities, through intellectually honest red team exercises.

* De-escalating the potential for future conflict between nuclear and nuclear capable states by instituting new regional diplomatic and security structures.

Short version: Good intelligence and statecraft needed.

Comment: All good ideas, whether nuclear or not.

Rethinking Deterrence

* Moral-political-legal campaigns that degrade the credibility of American deterrence by ratcheting upward the "unthinkability" of nuclear weapons use, thus tempting potential adversaries to risk the very brinksmanship scenarios ( war, apocalyptic terrorism) that would make the use of nuclear weapons possible or likely.

* Avoiding "nuclear weapons deflation" as an unintended consequence of arms control. Striking a balance between reducing large American and Russian arsenals and unduly increasing the military value of small ones and the temptation to increase them in order to reach "parity" with America and Russia ( "linkage" for all nuclear club arsenals). Or worse, the temptation to sell or use them.

* Developing new models of deterrence that would be concurrently perceived as credible by states, non-state actors and subnational/ transnational networks who may all be within an interdependent nexus of responsibility for a catastrophic WMD attack.

* Examining the balance of utility between emphasizing clarity and uncertainty in American nuclear response and deterrence policy in a multi-polar and non-state actor era.

Short version: Make deterrence more effective. Think through the ramifications of public presenations of nuclear weapons.

Comment: Deterrence is a complex mix of psychological and military factors, as Henry Kissinger notes in Mark’s quote. The psychological side needs to be rethought in today’s world. I would recommend revisiting the “madman” aspect of recent administration policy, both conventional and nuclear. Too chaotic a policy undermines the effectiveness of deterrence. I think that non-state actors are fundamentally undeterrable, but it’s worth continuing to think about this problem. John Robb (according to my friend Armchair Generalist) may have some useful ideas on that. There is a balance between clarity and ambiguity, but we’re much too far on the ambiguity side right now. That is because, as I’ve said before, we have no nuclear policy.

Thinking Toward the Future

*Identifying non-nuclear technologies that could result in weapons of a comparable order of magnitude of destruction or loss of life as with low-level nuclear weapons.

* Potential, novel, weaponization of of aspects of nuclear particle research outside classic uranium 235 and plutonium bombs.

Short version: Consider future developments.

Comment: I think that these technologies are both long, long shots, but it’s worth considering what can happen in the future. I would put more emphasis on future political developments than technological developments. However, we have to keep in mind that our control over the future of other nations is largely in the realm of diplomacy and persuasion. Yes, military strength plays into persuasion, but there’s much more to it than that.

Comments

[Dave Schuler]

Minor formatting issue: shouldn't “Re-Thinking Deterrence” and “Towards the Future” be bolded like the preceding sections rather than italicized?

I don't think I understand the first bullet under “Re-Thinking Deterrence”. Perhaps if you put it into a parallel construction with the preceding and succeeding bullets I might. Are you for or ag'in “Moral-political-legal campaigns that degrade the credibility of American deterrence”?

[zenpundit]

Hi Cheryl,

Your short versions are very good - wish I'd thought things through like that when I was writing my post.

And you are right, there's enough wide-spectrum agreement for policy movement to begin without waiting for some magical, perfect consensus moment to arrive before we begin.

Hi Dave,

I'm against such campaigns. I want most of the world to be pretty sure there's a high risk of American nuclear retaliation before their intelligence services visionaries start kicking around hare-brained, asymmetric warfare, schemes.

[CKR]

Hi Dave -

Thanks for picking up the inconsistencies. I think you're right, but I haven't checked back. That kind of double-checking is more difficult when I'm sitting in a hotel lobby with people coming and going, or cross-legged on the bed in a B&B room, than it is when I'm at home at my desk. Also, my laptop has Word 2007 on it, and I haven't entirely worked out the routine for composing on Word and then posting.

I had some trouble with Mark's formulation of that point too. (All those points are taken verbatim from his post. What he said is what I finally came up with as my interpretation after about three reads. I disagree somewhat with him on that point, but it's more degree than principle, although what I propose will include a no-first-use proclamation.