Thinking the Unthinkable: Leaving Iraq with Dignity, Compassion and Iraqi Employees

By PHK

Kudos to the Danes for undertaking the unthinkable and US Ambassador Ryan Crocker for at least broaching the subject. Crocker’s advice and concerns are a cold dose of realism in a US foreign policy which under this administration has generally been devoid of it.

Yet will the Bush administration listen?

According to a July 21, 2007 article in the International Herald Tribune, the Danish government has “secretly airlifted about 200 translators and other Iraqi employees and their relatives out of Iraq to try to keep them from coming to harm after it withdraws its ground forces later this summer.” In a similar vein as reported in the Washington Post on July 22, Crocker, in a two page cable, “has asked the Bush administration to . . . grant immigrant visas to all Iraqis employed by the US government in Iraq because of growing concern that they will quit and flee the country if they cannot be assured safe passage to the U.S.”

It’s more than time for the US to get those departure ducks in a row. We turned a blind eye in Vietnam in 1975 and hundreds and thousands of loyal Vietnamese US government employees and their families were left to fend for themselves. This often meant “reeducation camps,” separation, loss of livelihood, personal hardship and finally, for the lucky, escape by small boat through treacherous waters. Some made it – others didn’t.

Given America’s poor track record on the taking-care-of-those-who-work-for-us front, it’s no wonder that current Iraqi employees of the U.S. government now demand assurances for the afterwards. They and their families will need to depart Iraq to survive. The US government on its part has a moral obligation to help them resettle elsewhere – most likely the US.

It’s that simple.

There's also the wide scope, character and history of the US occupation of Iraq, the numbers of refugees will be thousands more than the small contingent working for the Danes – but then the U.S. is also a far larger country.

If we do it right this next time, we won’t need to deal – years later – with thousands of displaced persons like we did with the Vietnamese boat people. When I was Cultural Affairs Officer in the Philippines from 1992-4, the final Vietnamese refugee camp only closed there nearly 20 years after the US withdrawal from Vietnam.

Cambodia and Vietnam: How to do it and how not

The evacuation of the US Embassy in Vietnam April 1975 was the most botched operation I witnessed during my nearly 28 year Foreign Service career. Not only did the evacuation leave Vietnamese employees behind but it also almost left my USIS American colleagues and the entire staff of one of our Consulates there too. I don’t remember the consulate story as well – but if my memory still serves me, the Consulate staff had not been told of the evacuation. They were left to learn by hearsay and find their own way out via private river boat down the Mekong.

As I understand it – and I was serving as a junior officer in Bangkok at the time – our four remaining USIS staff members who worked in a separate building in Saigon from the Embassy were also not notified of the evacuation orders. It was only our quick thinking and acting USIS secretary who overheard something suspicious happening in the background on a phone call to a friend at the chancery. She raised the alarm. This made it possible for her, her boss and other American colleagues to be part of the evacuation.

That tragic scenario didn’t happen a few weeks earlier in Cambodia under Ambassador John Gunther Dean. That evacuation of Americans and Cambodians whose lives would have been endangered was well planned, well executed and worked like a clock. Dean’s memoirs (p. 26) explain why. Sure the numbers and commitments were far smaller – but the evacuation was well planned and – when the time came – executed.

People did not hang off the landing gear of helicopters. They were not left outside barbed wire fences heartbroken and desperate to leave. All but the most essential personnel had been sent out the weeks and days before.

What made the difference? The Ambassadors. Hopefully, when the time comes to leave Baghdad, Ryan Crocker or his successor will be foremost akin to John Gunther Dean in Phnom Penh not Graham Martin, our last Ambassador to South Vietnam, in Saigon.

Denmark to the rescue

In the meantime, the Danes deserve kudos for realism and compassion. As a small country with no imperial pretensions and a small contingent in Iraq, the number of their Iraqi employees evacuated is far smaller - and hence easier for a small country to handle. But that in itself takes courage. Bringing Muslim refugees into Europe is not exactly popular these days – yet leaving Iraqi employees and families behind could be tantamount to their death sentence. This would not sit well with the Danish population or their European compatriots.

Here in the US, the US Department of Homeland Security needs to rethink its niggardly policies towards the U.S. intake of Iraqi refugees (since 2003, the US has admitted only 825 Iraqi refugees whereas it has accepted 3,498 Iranians in the past nine months.) This Iraqi intake needs to include those who work for the U.S. government.

In 2006, Sweden “received 9,065 Iraqi asylum applications alone and approved about 80 percent” although rules have been recently tightened according to the “Post.” The State Department needs to speed up the paperwork and probably increase the number of employees dedicated to do so. This, unfortunately, is likely to be one more manifestation of the Department’s chronically understaffed and under-funded operation over which Condi Rice presides.

The bottom line? With planning and foresight, a US departure from Iraq need not resemble the fiasco in Saigon on April 30, 1975. A US evacuation can be done – but it must appear more like the all inclusive approach in Cambodia.

The Bush administration lied the American people into this mess in Iraq. Now as we think about withdrawal, we need to consider our moral responsibility to the people who risk their lives to work for us.

Think Phnom Penh on April 12 – not Saigon on April 30.

Comments

[BILL BURKE]

Let's not forget our departure from Somalia! Ambassador Bishop promised our FSNs that they would be evacuated with us. So, they stayed with us right up until the end. As I recall, at the last second, Washington directed the Embassy to leave the FSNs behind and use the saved aircraft space to evacuate third country nationals instead. All the FSNs and their families were subsequently murdered, including one who had been previously recognized by the State Department as the Department's FSN of the Year.

I wonder how many of our Iraqi employees know about our history of bailing out without honoring our promises to evacuate them?

[PHK]

Bill - Thanks so much for that chilling and sad reminder. Pat

[Matthew Chavez]

Great analysis Dr. Kushlis. Our betrayal of Iraqi employees is a disgrace. I remember reading a Times story about a translator that was facing extraordinary dangers for his assistance, his good friend was slain, he was threatened daily, and US officials did very little to help him. I fear that this will set a precedent for indigenous allies around the world. A quick question: On the YouTube/CNN debate, Gov. Richardson attempted to set himself apart by committing to withdraw all US forces in 6 months. Biden cast doubt on this plan as "unrealistic," arguing that US military officials have told him it would take at least 1 year to execute a total withdrawal. Any thoughts? Also, what do you make of the Clinton/Obama dispute about holding talks with unfriendly regimes?

[PHK]

Matt: Great to hear from you and thanks for the compliments. Re 6 months vs 1 year for a troop withdrawal. I fear both prescriptions are too simplistic for any number of reasons.

The US military moves amazingly rapidly when ordered - but how and what and who will it leave behind are the issues. I think the real questions now are diplomatic ones and both Richardson and Biden are far more likely to understand and respond to these issues and nuances than the politicals guiding our Iraq policy. This is why I think the ICG study recommendations were and still are so crucial.

Meanwhile Americans (and the administration) need to understand that the US government Iraqi employees and families will need our help in departing in the eventuality. See Bill Burke's comment above on Somalia. This happened about 1990. The Brits are facing the same dilemma. Look at the blog Blood and Treasure, for instance.