Marc Lynch on Sunni Differences in Iraq

by CKR

Marc Lynch has published an important article for understanding what is going on among Sunni factions in Iraq. According to him, it's not at all the way the MSM is reporting it. I find it a bit difficult to understand, partly because I'm not acquainted with the names of the groups in the way he is, an partly, I suspect, because it doesn't go according to most of the narratives we keep hearing.

So, at the risk of oversimplification, let me sketch out what Lynch is saying. Please read the whole article and correct me if I've got it wrong; I'm trying to understand it myself.

Islamic State of Iraq = Al-Qaeda's declared polity in Iraq.

Islamic Army of Iraq = One of the insurgency's stronger factions.

In October 2006, al-Qaeda declared the Islamic State of Iraq and now is aggressively insisting that others line up with its program. The Islamic Army of Iraq and some tribal leaders are voicing objections to al-Qaeda leaders outside Iraq.

The American presence in Iraq is part of al-Qaeda's program: Iraq is at the center of their global jihad, presumably where the Caliphate is to be reconstituted. The Americans provide propaganda and targets. Other Sunni factions see their primary goal as an independent Iraq, with the American gone. They are not interested in exporting jihad.

So one of the threats dragged out by the "stay the course" faction, the establishment of an al-Qaeda base in Iraq, is already established. The American presence feeds it. Other factions are turning against al-Qaeda, but not because of the American surge. They are the ones we hear about on the tv news who are asking for deadlines for withdrawal.

We're not talking about divide and conquer here, or the enemy of my enemy being my friend. None of them like the Americans, but if we weren't there, the focus might be on driving al-Qaeda from the country.

Comments

[zenpundit]

"Islamic State of Iraq = Al-Qaeda's declared polity in Iraq."

This is neither a simple propaganda gesture nor is it an attempt to build a real state. It's an enactment of a "virtual-state" by al Qaida and needs to be analyzed in that context, as a decentralized network system of primary loyalty and coercion and not in 20th century terms.

Fortunately, by accident or design, the U.S. military is encouraging and rewarding the tribals in their resistance ( strengthening a countervailing point of traditional and authentic Sunni primary loyalty against the Qaida "outsiders")

[CKR]

Mark -

I used the words declared and polity because I don't know exactly what al-Qaeda's "Islamic State of Iraq" is. I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss "an attempt to build a real state." I suspect that different adherents understand the drive toward the Caliphate in different ways.

But Baghdad is the historic seat of the Caliphate, and symbols are important.

Judging from what Lynch gets out of their documents, al-Qaeda has some real power in Iraq and is pushing it as far as they can. This is what the other insurgents are responding to, as I read his article.

Fortunately, by accident or design, the U.S. military is encouraging and rewarding the tribals in their resistance ( strengthening a countervailing point of traditional and authentic Sunni primary loyalty against the Qaida "outsiders")

I don't know if we can be this optimistic. If it is indeed by accident, the more likely possibility given that none of the official analysis seems to overlap with Lynch's by much, then actions could change at any time to less favorable ones.

I'll go back to Clausewitz and Sun Tzu: know your enemy. And, as I read those who can read the primary documents in those languages, what we're hearing from the MSM gives no reason at all to feel that the official position incorporates that very primary principle.

[zenpundit]

Hi Cheryl,

Having been trained in historical methodology, I'm all for primary source documents. However, there is also an AQ regional track record here in the "Emirate of Afghanistan" and the shadowy prewar AQ presence in Kurdistan and KSA to consider. Then you can broaden to non-AQ Islamist models like Hamas and Hezbollah.

So far, the Islamists have been far better at State-breaking than State-building.