Another dangerous game in the theater of the absurd?

By PHK

Will some one please give me even half a sane reason as to why the Bush administration recently announced its plans to introduce anti-missile defense sites into Poland and the Czech Republic? Do the Poles or the Czechs really need or want them? Does Europe need or want them?

Sorry, but the stated US administration rationale of protecting these two relatively new and peaceful Central European NATO and EU members from an Iranian missile threat, in my view, doesn’t wash. I find it hard to believe that the Iranians even in their wildest dreams are likely to rain missiles down upon either Poland or the Czech Republic. It just doesn’t make sense.

So, a few questions:

Why would the Poles or the Czechs want anti-missile defense shields? Or even agree to accept them? Is there some kind of under-the-table US quid pro quo that’s part of the deal? And if so, what is it and is the price worth it?

Iranian missiles would presumably need to zoom over Russia, the Caucasus, the Ukraine, Turkey and/or the Balkans before hitting Polish or Czech soil. Frankly, from what I’ve read, I question whether loosing missiles on Central Europe would be at the top of an Iranian hit list anyway even if its powers that be produce, beg, borrow or steal sufficient missiles – or the missile technology (read North Korean according to US sources) to produce weapons that reach that far.

Let’s not even ask the question as to whether a US developed anti-missile defense shield is capable of deterring a missile or a barrage of medium and long range missiles. The last time I noticed, the rhetoric from the Star Wars folk was far more effective than the products they were then hawking. Or has something changed?

So it’s no wonder German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier had some strong words for our erstwhile Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's Star Wars II announcement.

Maybe, just maybe, some of the Europeans do not see dealing with the Iranian threat W’s way. Perhaps they think there are other ways to deal with recalcitrant Iranians short of installing a questionably functioning missile defense shield in Central Europe whose very mention has provoked the Russians and could destabilize Europe politically as well as militarily.

Maybe, just maybe, some of the Europeans do not see dealing with the Iranian threat W’s way. Perhaps they think there are other ways to deal with recalcitrant Iranians short of installing a questionably functioning missile defense shield in Central Europe whose very mention has provoked the Russians and could destabilize Europe politically as well as militarily.

It’s also no surprise that the Russians - including and especially Vladimir Putin – have objected so vociferously to the contents of Rice’s announcement of this new endeavor.

Furthermore, for Rice and US Ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland to feign surprise at the negative Russian reaction to this latest US military initiative is either disingenuous, naïve or just plain stupid. I’m going to bet on the former. A missile defense system near Russia’s front door is like waving a red flag in the face of an angry bull and Rice and Nuland must know that all too well.

Rice, after all, was Senior Director for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the National Security Council from 1989-1991. Nuland served at the US Embassy in Moscow when the Soviet Union fell apart and was later Deputy Director for former Soviet Union affairs at the State Department (1997-99).

So they have to know that the Russians view missile defense systems as something akin to contracting the plague. This is no state secret. Over the years, the Russians have never shied away from stating and restating this position. And they have also said they will find an asymmetrical way to respond. And yes, W and company, they do have some options: read on.

Another Red Flag

The introduction of anti-missile defense sites in countries that border Russia supposedly to defend these two Central European countries against an Iranian missile attack while our new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates just listed Russia (along with China, North Korea and Iran) as a potential threat to US security is another red flag. He did this in recent testimony before a House of Representatives Committee meeting. Having Russia added to the administration’s latest possible enemies list alone would have set the Putin government on edge or worse – particularly given this administration’s too fast on the trigger approach to most things international.

But this whole Central European anti-missile defense scenario is so bizarre it resonates like something dreamed up by people under the influence of a hallucinatory drug concocted at the American Enterprise Institute, their cronies from other DC think tanks and those in the Vice President’s office and the NSC in cahoots with appropriate representatives of the US defense/aviation industry (read Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and TRW for starters) who will clearly profit from making and installing these anti-missile defense shields.

The rationale as explained by the State Department is just plain strange. Here’s the gist: the Iranians may get North Korean missile technology which would then inspire them to plaster Poland and the Czech Republic with nukes - or maybe all of Europe.

But wait a minute. Didn’t the Iranian government switch its foreign exchange accounts to the Euro in part because the US has been actively freezing Iranian government overseas dollar holdings? So why would the Iranians want to destroy Europe and the Euro?

Anyway, to continue the peyote smoking scenario: so the US puts anti-missile shields in North Central Europe to defend Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese soil. Right? Or have I missed something. I think that’s what State Department Scott McCormack was foggily attempting to explain to at least one skeptical reporter at the Friday, February 23 Daily Press Briefing. Sorry, Mr. McCormack, I didn’t catch it either.

Which leads me to ask: Which neocon dreamed up this latest “greatest idea?” The controversial Elliot Abrams, Deputy National Security Council Director, who is doing his best to undercut Condoleezza Rice’s efforts to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process? Robert Kagan, Nuland’s neocon husband? He, after all, claims to be an expert on US-Russian relations (among most other foreign policy related things) although one look at his bio suggests that his Russian expertise must come from his wife.

Someone directly associated with Cheney’s office? Nuland herself was “Principal Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Cheney from July 2003 until May 2005 where she worked on the full range of global issues, including the promotion of democracy and security in Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Lebanon and the broader Middle East.” She must still have close connections with some of the hawks in the Cheney constabulary and its “watchers” strategically situated in other parts of the US foreign affairs bureaucracy.

Or was it devised at a secret backroom neocon holiday party – like really near the end?

Another take on this bizarre subject

Or should we look at this anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic proposal scenario in a different light?

The Russians, after all, play a critical role in Iran’s light water nuclear reactor development and the US announcement to introduce anti-missile shields in Poland and the Czech Republic is a “check” in that on-going game.

Even though the US media rarely mentions Russia’s role in supporting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it is the Russians, not the Pakistanis or any other country, who are building Iran’s light water reactor at Bushehr. This is what New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson alluded to in his WaPo oped "Diplomacy, Not War, With Iran" on February 24.

Further, according to a recent Congressional Research Service report, this is happening much to the consternation of the White House and Congress and with reason. Yet the Russians have also offered to insist that the Iranians return all spent fuel to Russia for reprocessing but that has only received tepid approval from the Bush administration.

Meanwhile, the Iranians seem to be plowing full steam ahead – at least according to the IAEA – which reported on Thursday that Iran has expanded its nuclear enrichment program in defiance of a UN Security Council demand that it stop by this week (this according to AFP).

But still it’s the Russians who hold the most important turn-key to Iran’s nuclear reactor development. It also seems to me that Russian foreign policy turns on financial concerns as well as the desire to be taken seriously in the international arena. Both needs need to be considered here.

As far as Bushehr is concerned, the Russians can speed it up – or slow it down as Rose Gottemoeller, Director of Carnegie’s Moscow Center, explained to the New York Times. And they have done both in the past quite effectively. It looked until last week at least as if they were trying to slow the reactor’s development down again, but for how long?

The Russians recently told the Iranians they would not accept Euros in lieu of dollars without renegotiating the reactor contract and as a consequence would not supply Iran with the necessary nuclear fuel until they were paid in dollars. This, according to the Russians and other experts as reported by the New York Times “will delay, perhaps by a year, any delivery of nuclear fuel to Iran.”

But the Russians have also supported stronger UN Security Council measures in response to Iran’s noncompliance with the Council’s demand to have stopped its enrichment program by this past week.

So should the US anti-missile shield Central European site announcement be seen as a spectacularly ill-timed move in a multi-cornered chess game being played by the US, the Russians and the Iranians? Or part of a strange game of international chicken that those of us on the outside looking in do not fully understand?

Asymmetrical responses

What if, for instance, the Russians suddenly decide Euro payments are just fine? This is not impossible – I remember having to pay for certain products in Moscow in Deutsch Marks ten years before the Soviet Union broke up. And the Euro is a strong currency. Or what if the Russians decide to block US initiatives to put more screws on the Iranians in the UN and the IAEA?

Or another possibility: what if Russia decides to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Range Forces treaty and resume production of medium range missiles as threatened by Russian General Yuri Baluyevsky? This is what apparently upset the German Foreign Minister and it would not be unprecedented especially in this day and age: just look at the W administration’s flagrant disregard for arms control treaties over the past six years.

Asymmetry, after all, can come in various shapes and sizes. So I guess if I were W and his foreign policy gurus, I’d be a little more careful with the military toys – unless of course their motivating factor is to provoke an “unavoidable” incident that would lead to American – and/or Israeli – military action against the Iranians while destabilizing Europe as well.

What is it W? And for heavens’ sake why?

Map Credit: Perry-Castaneda Map Collection, University of Texas (CIA - 1996)

Comments

[CKR]

The missile interceptor deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic are said to be primarily to protect the United States against Iran's missiles, although Iran doesn't currently have such long-range missiles, and there are serious doubts about whether this is the best place for them.

Recent US rhetoric, however, suggests that they are for the protection of Europe. I suspect that this is a bit of obfuscation designed to make the deployments more palatable there. Besides, according to the link, they are not the sort of missiles (THAAD) that would be used for protection near a target.

The fact that Iran doesn't have intercontinental ballistic missiles, which would be required to hit the United States, and the (apparently) suboptimal placement for interception of Iranian missiles are undoubtedly elements in Russia's concern.

Missile trajectories aren't my specialty, and this can get very complicated. Let me just say that in order to shoot down a missile, the best place is after it's boosted to its main flying altitude and before it gets too near the target. This requires close coordination of flying times and paths of the target missile and interceptor.

It looks to me like the Czech Republic and Poland might make some sense for missiles from Russia, although great-circle routes from Russia to the US are over the North Pole. The interceptors don't have to be stationed directly under the path, though.

It seems to me that Russia is a bit oversensitive about missile deployments in Europe, other things being equal. But regime change and other Bush rhetoric, accompanied by actions like removing the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, have put us all on guard. Missile deployment in Europe is a sensitive subject because of the Pershing deployments in the 1980s, which Rice should certainly have known. Those deployments were in response to Soviet intermediate-range missile deployments, and it all led eventually to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty removing all those missiles. Which is what the Russians say they're thinking of getting out of if the Polish and Czech deployments go through.

I wouldn't be surprised if the Russians are wondering exactly what kind of missiles will be at these bases.

If we must deploy these missiles (and I remain skeptical about their efficacy against anyone else's), it would have been wise to consult with the Russians before an announcement. (Again, Rice knows this.) But I note that the press conferences and other government material is short on information and occasionally refers to the sensitivity of the information they're not giving us, par for the Bush admin's course.

[J.]

"Missile trajectories aren't my specialty, and this can get very complicated. Let me just say that in order to shoot down a missile, the best place is after it's boosted to its main flying altitude and before it gets too near the target. This requires close coordination of flying times and paths of the target missile and interceptor."

This is exactly the issue. I've been watching this and trying to figure out how to address it, maybe I'll piggyback on your excellent post. Essentially, the focus is on a Middle East ballistic missile threat, and the intent is to identify a launch and to initiate an intercept in the initial launch step of said missile. There's no one thinking that a number of interceptors in Poland are going to do much to a Russian capability other than annoy the Bear. So why Poland and Czech Republic?

Two main reasons - first, the US govt wants a unilateral capability to detect a launch and start an intercept as soon as possible. You start getting much closer than eastern Europe, and you lose friendly, accessible countries (not sure Turkey qualifies anymore for this purpose, especially if it's known that the equipment is to take out a Muslim missile). Second, using eastern Europe instead of Germany - it's cheaper and the Germans pissed off the US govt with their failure to support the Iraq war. Pretty simple, except for one thing.

That's 25 million dead Soviets from World War II. I don't think Russia has ever forgotten what happens when you allow threats near your border. Russia's almost xenophobic in that regard (not that I'm a Russia expert, but I do know a few things about their military). Anything that could possibly be viewed as offensive weapons or defensive weapons aimed at their offensive capabilities, in any form, is not good. Expanding NATO when the Warsaw Pact has been gone for years is therefore bad. So are missile defense systems near their border, regardless for whom they're designed.

The US govt is of course blindly thinking of its own unilateral interests and wants Russia to get over its World War II losses and grow up. If the US govt thought more of diplomatic and nonproliferation initiatives (and Russia's history), they'd never go here. But the goal of STRATCOM is to design a global strike capability, and inherent in that capability is not to rely on anyone else. Therefore, one needs radar all over the globe. Easy to figure out, but the US govt lack of desire to work as a world community is the hard part to work with.

[CKR]

If the US govt thought more of diplomatic and nonproliferation initiatives (and Russia's history), they'd never go here.

Sigh. If only. We don't do arms control any more, according to the Bush administration, but if they knew (or wanted to know) something about arms control, they would know that missile control is part of it too. If the US is proliferating what they call defensive missiles, others will proliferate missiles of their own. And we've recently seen North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran all messing with missiles.

And, of course, believing another country's word that any weapons system is "purely defensive" is absurd.

But the goal of STRATCOM is to design a global strike capability, and inherent in that capability is not to rely on anyone else.

Excellent point. It's the radars that are important, not the missiles, in this case.

On another point, I noticed that Secretary of State Rice said on the Sunday talk shows that there had been advance consultation with the Russians on this system. Of course, as a colleague pointed out to me this morning, that could mean almost anything. True consultation would have offered the Russians a part in the siting decisions. How about Ukraine, for example, to guard against Iranian missiles for both Russia and the US?

[Victoria Samson]

Actually, in the MDA's explanation for the FY 08 budget request, they claimed that a radar in Eastern Europe was needed to protect other early warning radars for the ballistic missile defense system. Nuh-huh. First I've heard of this, and completely unwarranted by facts on the ground.