Britain's Nuke Decision - Updated

by CKR

Tony Blair recommended on Monday that his plan for Britain's nuclear weapons future is to decrease the warheads carried by submarines from 200 to 160, which will allow the planned ballistic-missile submarine fleet to decrease from 4 to 3.

Britain's old missile fleet needs replacement, so the nature of that replacement has been under study. Building the new subs and possibly new warheads will take a decade or more, and £20-25 billion.

John Ikenberry then suggested that Blair would have been wiser to propose no nukes at all in Britain's future. Michael Levi seconded Ikenberry, and, in response to comments, Ikenberry laid out his preferences for the United States.

There are a couple of things wrong with Ikenberry's proposal. Primarily, he is inconsistent in his statement that "I don’t believe in disarmament — I believe in arms control" when he suggests that Blair might better have eschewed a future nuclear capability.

Arms control implies negotiations and treaties to keep the balance of nuclear power. The Bush administration has thrown such things overboard. George Bush didn't even want the Moscow Treaty, which currently is being verified under the continuing START I provisions, which will run out in 2009, with no negotiations for a continuation of verification. Not to mention their throwing out, unilaterally, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. No negotiations there, either. The continuing negotiations at the Council on Disarmament have been given short shrift by the Bush administration, too.

And then there's a US foreign policy that has dragged Britain along like that sad forgotten dog leashed to the RV bumper.

So Britain should give up its nuclear force, just like that, no negotiations, no concessions to its national interest, no security assurances? I don't think so.

Ikenberry's long-range goals are good ones:

* announce that the sole purpose of retaining any nuclear weapons was to prevent their use by others,
* eliminate tactical nuclear weapons entirely and reduce (unilaterally where possible) its overall nuclear force levels to a few hundred weapons;
* remove nuclear weapons from their delivery systems in order to lengthen the time between a decision to use nuclear weapons and their actual use;
* and negotiate far-reaching arms control treaties to codify and verify these reductions, and ban nuclear testing, fissile material production, as well as the deployment of long-range ballistic missiles.

Unfortunately, we are now so far behind on arms control that small steps will be needed to build credibility back.

Actually, small and continuing steps are what arms control (and any good diplomacy) are about. Large bold steps, when they are possible, are inspiring. But an announcement of Ikenberry's program now, by this administration, would be put into the context of the too many times they have announced bold initiatives that turn out to be hollow of planning or funding.

Coincidentally, I had an op-ed in the Los Alamos Monitor on November 26 (not on line) advocating some smaller, and perhaps more believable steps that George Bush might take. Unfortunately, it looks like Iraq is drowning out everything else. But here are my suggestions.

1) Ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. Bill Clinton signed the treaty in 1996. President Bush should present the treaty to the Senate with a strong recommendation for ratification.

2) De-alert nuclear missiles in concert with Russia.

3) Begin negotiations on verification of the Moscow Treaty, which sets a goal of 2200 nuclear weapons each for the United States and Russia by 2012. It is currently being verified under START I provisions that end in 2009.

4) Complete securing nuclear material in Russia begun under the Nunn-Lugar program.

5) Consolidate excess US plutonium at the Savannah River Facility and build the necessary facilities to convert weapons materials to a storable form under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

6) State clearly and unambiguously that the United States will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any future conflict. China is the only country that has pledged no first use.

When these actions become credible, then George Bush will be in a position to move toward Ikenberry's program.

Update (12/8/06): Lots more detail about the British program here.

Comments

[James]

I understand your logic: that Britain's ballistic missile submarines are a asset in negotiations that they should not give up without getting something in return. Trading away a military "asset" that is no longer of use is an old and admired tactic in arms control negotiations.

Unfortunately, these submarines are also an albatross around the Royal Navy's necks. Being old, they are expensive to maintain, while replacing them would cost, as you pointed out, 20-25 billion pounds (up to fifty billion dollars at the current exchange rates). With arms control negotiations moribund and needing to be rebuilt using small steps, and no small steps currently on the horizon, Britain cannot really afford to wait for the 2008 elections in the US.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles are neat, but given the current situation around the world, I think the money could be better spent on almost anything else. Better to develop a new air-dropped weapon or, if they are really determined, simply install them in hardened silos on land.

"No first-use" should be incumbent on all nuclear powers, along with "no use against non-nuclear states." That would be a bold move that would cost them little, since their stated intention for having their nuclear weapons is deterrence. India's current policy is also "no first-use," though I understand the government is under pressure to change it.

[Phila]

What do you think about Blair's apparent claim that these missiles are needed to deter "state-sponsored terrorism"? Is that a fairly unreasonable justification, or am I overreacting?

Also, while doing a winter cleaning, I found an interesting old book of Estonian folk tales. I though I'd send it to you, if you're interested...

[CKR]

Thanks for the good comments and questions.

Backword Dave has a nice little signature: "hurriedly scribbled by". That's how I do some of my posts, this one in particular. I'll stick with what I've said overall, although there are a number of refinements I wish I had added. But if I got it all right the first time, we wouldn't have anything to discuss!

The basic problem is what the US has done to its credibility in the last six years. The end of the Cold War disrupted the nuclear umbrella system, and it's even more in disarray since we've learned that the US can act like a rogue nation and will ignore previous commitments when it unilaterally sees fit. So it's unfair to expect Britain to take up the nuclear slack, not to mention highly disproportionate, if we compare Britain's few hundred warheads to America's thousands.

That's why I recommend some small steps to show that the US is headed back toward its own commitments to nonproliferation.

Some of my recommendations are just talk, but important talk. The no-first-use statement is one of these. Such a statement would move toward a different context in which we discuss nuclear weapons. No first use was more problematic between the US and the Soviet Union, but I agree with James that it should be a no-brainer for nuclear powers in today's world.

The reason why I say it's just talk is that by itself, it guarantees nothing. Any nation that seriously weighed the balance and found a first nuclear strike to its benefit would do it, previous statements notwithstanding. A no-first-use commitment would be stronger in the context of regional defense agreements, but I think that in today's world, it would be a good thing for the US to say.

It's going to take a decade or more to replace Britain's ballistic-missile submarines. As we've seen in the last decade, the world can change a lot in that time. It's getting harder to make these decisions because so much time is needed to vault the many environmental and regulatory hurdles, award the contracts, and actually build these complex and demanding things. The US Department of Energy is slipping and sliding on its Complex 2030 plans for similar reasons. It seems to me that this slow-motion replacement could be used as a spur to thinking out what really will be needed, with a much wider discussion than just within the bureaucracy.

The submarine ballistic missile fleet is designed to be a survivable deterrent for massive Cold War nuclear exchanges. How relevant is that to today's situation?

When the Soviet Union gave up its doctrine of class warfare in foreign relations (1989) and Russia did not continue it, the calculations of nuclear war changed fundamentally. I haven't seen that nuclear strategy has changed along with those calculations.

Phila, the words I'm seeing in your post are "perilous threats from rogue regimes and state-sponsored terrorists." The intention there seems to be to threaten that if a nuke goes off somewhere and we can trace it, the rogue regime that supplied it can expect a return in kind. That's as good as nuclear deterrence gets these days, and I think it's legitimate, as far as it goes.

The problem is that it doesn't go very far. What if those Floridians and Londoners really were more than fantasizing post-adolescents and managed to make contact with a rogue regime that gave them a nuke? It's a long chance at best, for the many reasons I've previously enumerated. And it doesn't address those al-Qaeda frogmen. You've got to have property that can be nuclearly destroyed to be deterred by nukes.

I await the book excitedly! I have a small collection of Estonian books; maybe I'll blog about them someday. :)

[James]

But it also begs the question of whether a fifty-billion-dollar undersea superfortress is really necessary to deter a state or group with only a couple of nukes to play with. Realistically, aircraft have had little trouble penetrating the defenses of Third World countries up until now; land-based missiles would not be vulnerable to the crude weapons terrorists and North Koreans would have access to.

The nuclear missile boats are justified by the existence of a peer-competitor, a rival state with an array of ICBMs that have a reasonable shot of destroying all land-based assets. Right now, you're limited to three: the US, France, and Russia, and the last is doubtful.

I agree that "no-first-use" is just words, but even the US cannot completely ignore world opinion. What is needed is the creation of global consensus that nuclear weapons use is simply out of bounds, regardless of provocation. We had that once, but it has sadly slipped ever since the threat of a "global exchange" receded. Not to be cynical, but ever since we in the West have no longer found ourselves in the nuclear crosshairs, we simply haven't taken the issue of weapons use seriously. That is, we care VERY DEEPLY about non-proliferation, which weapons might be used against us, but have ignored issues surrounding existing arsenals.

What does this say to the rest of the world? They are expected to give the West constant reassurance that no weapons will be developed that will threaten us, but they get nothing in return except for "don't argue with us and you won't get nuked." Is it a surprise that even traditional allies are becoming restless under such a policy? During the Cold War it was understood that a nuke used anywhere would drag in the superpower patron and the risk of a global exchange. We have created a situation where Third World countries are wistful for Evil Empire, which at least pretended to care if their capitol was immolated.

[Phila]

Phila, the words I'm seeing in your post are "perilous threats from rogue regimes and state-sponsored terrorists." The intention there seems to be to threaten that if a nuke goes off somewhere and we can trace it, the rogue regime that supplied it can expect a return in kind. That's as good as nuclear deterrence gets these days, and I think it's legitimate, as far as it goes.

Point taken. But we also seem to agree that there's some ambiguity there (as we ought to, given how many people still believe that Saddam was behind 9/11). Beyond that, this sort of deterrence presupposes a level of rationality - especially among religious fanatics with a propensity for self-annihilation - that I can't quite accept. Cost/benefit analyses that involve a World to Come remain tricky, and as always, I worry more about attacks that are intended to provoke overreaction in pursuit of some higher goal.

I completely agree with your point about negotiations, security agreements, etc. And your op-ed, of course. And as I say, I may just be overreacting to the AP article because I'm so tired of terrorism being trotted out the ultimate argument-settler.

[CKR]

What is needed is the creation of global consensus that nuclear weapons use is simply out of bounds, regardless of provocation.

Exactly. The steps I propose are the first small steps on a journey toward that goal. Many more will be required.

I'm not sure that consensus was firm under MADD, which was more like Oppenheimer's two scorpions in a bottle. And Israel, India and Pakistan didn't find either of the nuclear umbrellas congenial, so they developed their own. Others considered that road.

I agree that the US and its nuclear friends have taken a position, particularly in the last six years, that we must be protected from others' nukes, but we may do as we want with our own nuclear programs. That must be turned around before the role of nuclear weapons can be devalued.

And I'll agree that ballistic-missile submarines are an overreaction to terrorism. Although a single nuclear strike would be terrible, it would be far less than scenarios we envisioned during the Cold War.

It's obvious that strategies for the possession of one or two nukes are different from strategies for a dozen or so are different from strategies for hundreds or more. That distinction certainly isn't made in official pronouncements like Blair's. We can hope that it is being made in classified discussions.