Kiesling's Diplomacy Lessons: A Book Review Essay

By PHK

Brady Kiesling’s Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower (Potomac, 2006) is a book which, as Harvard University’s veteran international relations professor Stanley Hoffman wrote in the August 10, 2006 New York Review of Books, should be required reading for anyone contemplating a career as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer.

I also think it should be required reading for students of international politics and American foreign policy as well as on the list of any American concerned about the direction of our national security policies.

Why? Because this readable, 277 page book demonstrates - through myriads of examples drawn from Kiesling’s own experiences to illustrate his points - the Byzantine complexities of U.S. foreign policy making, its too often tortured implementation and the short and long term repercussions when mistakes are made.

In so doing, Diplomacy Lessons demonstrates the dilemmas and limitations of a career professional service and its talented members when run over and beaten down by an arrogant administration with no respect for their expertise – preferring instead to take the ill-founded “advice” of a coterie of idealistic political ideologues lacking real world experience and self-serving Iraqi con men. Together they led an inexperienced and unqualified president down the path to nowhere and caused - among other things - Kiesling to resign in protest years before his time.

When I taught international politics several years ago, I described the U.S. foreign policy making process to incredulous university students who had no idea how “the sausage was made.” Eyes grew wide. Yet, none of the international relations texts I had reviewed in preparation for the class – including the one I used – provided even a hint at what really happens in Foggy Bottom, at the National Security Council or behind Embassy walls.

It seems to me, therefore, that those of us who have experienced the real world of US diplomacy owe such explanations to the American public if we want our citizens to understand how the U.S. operates overseas and why it is perceived abroad the way it is. Kiesling’s new book does just that – and more because he also debunks – but sometimes supports – the underpinnings of international relations theories through real world experiences of U.S. diplomats including his own.

Kiesling also characterizes the operation of the State Department and its relations with other foreign affairs agencies very well indeed. He tells of a professional service that fails to value the area and linguistic expertise of its officer corps in favor of Washington bureaucratic operatives. Exactly so. That’s the reason we have so few Arabists and Arabic linguists capable of handling this difficult language and culture at a professional level. State’s assignments and promotion policies work against both. The “end of history” foreign affairs agencies downsizing in the 1990s forced a vast majority to retire prematurely. It takes years to replace their expertise and we’re paying for it now. This is true for virtually every other difficult to learn language as well. Ambassador Monteagle Stearns documented the problem clearly in his landmark book on the U.S. Foreign Service Talking to Strangers in the1990s.

Further, this administration’s empty gestures to change these ill-founded policies through vastly under-funded, vastly over-publicized initiatives are a drop in the ocean.

Democacy-building ain’t easy

Kiesling’s firsthand recollections of the problems of democracy-building in post-Soviet Armenia and Romania after Ceaucescu should make anyone who believes waving a magic wand and holding elections will metamorphose a dictatorship into a democracy think more than twice. It just doesn’t work that way and Kiesling tells us why.

US-Greek Relations: a case study in the long term effects of bad policies

I also have other reasons for liking Kiesling’s book. Kiesling is a Greek specialist who spent several years at different times assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Athens. I too devoted chunks of my own Foreign Service career to Greece. I know Brady Kiesling and it turns out that we have several friends and acquaintances in common - although our paths did not cross until October 2004 and months after his resignation.

Like Kiesling, I had worked in Greece before entering the Foreign Service. Kiesling began his Greek odyssey as a classics major. He still lives in Athens. And he is still involved in archeological digs. He draws upon these experiences for his book. Fresh out of college, I worked as a Teaching Fellow at Anatolia College in Thessaloniki from 1965-66 where I delved only minimally into the classics – although I did visit numerous archeological sites. Instead, I immersed myself in the history and politics of the Balkans – Macedonia and Greece in particular - which I ultimately drew upon for my MA and PhD theses and which began my life long fascination with this complex multi-ethnic checkerboard in Europe's southeast.

This is also where and when I witnessed the increasing political instability that resulted in the April 1967 Greek military colonels’ coup which Kiesling correctly points to as the first of three cataclysmic events which Greeks blamed on the US and that soured US-Greek relations for years thereafter.

The second problem was the close relations between the hated junta and the U.S. government between 1969 and 1974 when the junta collapsed due to its own ineptitude over Cyprus. I am not convinced that the US was behind the 1967 coup for a variety of reasons. Kiesling supports my convictions.

I worked at the Embassy (actually at USIS) as a first tour officer during 1970-71. I know, therefore, that after Nixon became president in 1969, the relationships between his political appointee ambassador Henry Tasca and the junta were so cordial we felt the seismic reactions to this ill-begotten policy for decades thereafter. Not only was the Greek public outraged at our fawning support for the hated military rulers, but also our mistaken policies provided a rationale for a small, homegrown, scraggly, ideologically bizarre Greek terrorist group called November 17(N-17) to murder American officials stationed in Athens from 1975 until June 29, 2002 when they were arrested.

America’s public diplomacy debacle

Kiesling sees the relevance of robust public diplomacy, but realizes – unlike our current Secretary of State – that not everyone in an Embassy is cut out to engage in or has the time to do public diplomacy and as importantly that even the best public diplomacy and public diplomacy diplomats cannot sell bad policy. In addition, he accurately describes the disappearance of the U.S. government’s public diplomacy specialists after the destruction of the U.S. Information Agency in 1999. What this will portend for the future is an excellent question – but I am convinced that nothing will begin to change until at least January 2009.

There are a few places where I disagree with Kiesling’s analyses or recommendations. But here is the major one: a suggestion near the book's conclusion that the CIA be integrated into the Foreign Service and that State and CIA's research and analysis arms be combined. On the one hand, I think Kiesling is right that we should be thinking now about rearranging the foreign affairs deck chairs after the current administration, but I question this proposal's efficacy. Why?

It seems to me that built-in redundancy in the analytical capabilities of our civilian intelligence services is a safeguard we can well afford even in a post-Iraq belt-tightening. Further, from what I've observed, the personality traits, training, career patterns and expertise needed to make successful spies versus successful diplomats are not the same.

I still think, however, that Diplomacy Lessons is well worth the time, effort and money invested in reading it, and if possible, meeting and hearing from its author if you have the chance.

As CKR indicated yesterday, Kiesling is on a book tour of the U.S. He will speak and sign copies of Diplomacy Lessions at Garcia Street Books in Santa Fe, New Mexico at 5 pm Monday October 16 and at the University of New Mexico at Mitchell Hall, Room 101 at 12:30 on Tuesday, October 17.

For Santa Fe listeners, he will be interviewed live by KSFR’s Mary-Charlotte Domandi on her morning radio show on October 16. It begins at 8:06 am Mountain Time on KSFR 90.7 FM Santa Fe Public Radio, and streaming live on the web at http://ksfr.org The dates and locations of his events elsewhere are on Brady Kiesling's website: Check them out – and bring your friends. These are events not to be missed.

Comments

[Shawn]

Patricia,

Thanks for the informative review. Until your comment on my blog, I'd almost forgotten all about picking a copy of this book up. He was interesting in person, now I owe his book a read. (I just wish they'd quit pricing hard cover books all in the $30+ range these days.)

I can't speak for the other languages, but I will say that I find the Russian section at FSI to be well-organized and competent. We have about 60 students in Russian at the moment and I haven't heard much in the way of grumbling from anyone yet.

[PHK]

Shawn: Glad to hear that Russian training at FSI has improved since my experience there in 1977-78. We had 40 plus students. The political officers were favored by a senior teacher to the detriment of the rest of us. On the other hand, we had a new linguist who tried to make things better and I think ultimately did. You're obviously a beneficiary.

I think you'll find Kiesling's book interesting (but disheartening) for another reason - his experiences in Armenia - and his observations about the difficulties of democracy building in even such a small country with a large American diasphora.

Good luck with the Russian. It's a fascinating country and an incredibly rich language. And I think the country deserves far more US attention than it now gets.

[Alice]

I remember when Kiesling resigned and that I and many of my friends (we were all in education) were so impressed with his statement at the time. But then it dropped off my radar screen, so I am pleased at this opportunity to return to reading some of his wisdom. Thank you for bringing it to our attention.
You comment on how long it takes to bring a democracy to a dictatorship; I fear we are in the throes of finding out how long it will take to do the reverse here at home.

[PHK]

Alice: I was really impressed with Kiesling's 2003 letter to Powell too - and I had never met him at the time. I hope you find his book as informative - and more so.

Keep your fingers crossed and get involved in politics yourself if you're not already, but just maybe the November Congressional elections will show that we still have a democracy and a public that can only be fooled some of the time.

[Frederick Vreeland]

Dear Patricia: Marrakech, 14 X 2006 Impressed by your Kiesling book review and of your own comments on a subject very close to my heart. The AsstSec's can be centers of policy making, but must stand up to idealogues and party political appointees. Also, there is all the difference between policy making for countries of interest to the top and those not. What do you see as decisive steps to reform the horrendous neglect of Foreign Service officers in the field on the part of the State Department "policy makers."
I don't consider Henry Tasca a political appointment as I had worked with him when he'd been AsstSec for Africa, then Amb to Morocco.
Regards, Freck Vreeland

[PHK]

Freck: Thanks for your excellent comments: good points. Here are a few of my thoughts re foreign service changes that need to happen: 1) promotion priorities that reward language and area qualified officers and if this is to the detriment of admin and consular people so be it - maybe getting rid of cones would help; 2) far more training in hands on management and leadership skills at all levels for everyone - no exceptions. If FSI can't do it well, there are grad schools including my own (Maxwell) that can; 3) a commitment to promote people who serve overseas as opposed to those who stay in Washington and play the bureaucratic one-upmanship game; 4) a smoothing out or diminishing of the traditional out moded hierarchical system and more flexibility of assignments to different fs specialties; 5) a requirement that language and area studies training be continued at post until the 4/4 level. 6) If possible, reduce the amount of time in language study at FSI to six months then make it possible for the officer to have in-depth language study in country up to 3/3 and beyond; 7) rethinking fortress Embassies and ever increasing reporting requirements which tend to keep officers behind the ever higher walls when they should be out talking to people; 8) a large enough personnel cadre to allow training to happen; 9) an easier flow between veteran FSOs and State civil servants so that FSOs are not penalized if they need to stay in the US, e.g. so that they can convert to civil servants without losing salary level and likewise so civil servants are not penalized in terms of their retirement system if they fill an overseas FSO vacancy; 10) rethinking the way the "up or out" system operates because it makes no sense financially (why invest thousands of dollars into language training if these are the people you force to retire first?) I think the SFS threshhold time in class/grade cutoff is one impediment. 11) a coordinated personnel assignments and career advancement policy that assigns people to the same countries (and languages) as they progress overtime - developing long term relationships are crucial as Kiesling points out with respect to Amb. Stearns' tenure in Athens.

Probably others too, but this is for starters. Your thoughts and comments?

Re Amb. Tasca - if I remember correctly, he entered the system as a political - but somehow either converted to career or given his positions which at that illustrious level would all have been political remained as a political apointee. Regardless, as you can see from my comments, he may have been excellent elsewhere, but I thought he was a bad choice for the position in Athens. And I know the political reporting was badly skewed under his watch.

[Edward Alexander]

As PAO in Athens I worked for Amb. Tasca in the early 1970s and tried always to convince him to invite leading opposition figures of the Colonels' regime to dinner. Finally he did and during its course, the doorbell to the Residence rang, the butler answered, whispered something urgently to Tasca, who excused himself and left us all looking at each other questioningly. When he returned he revealed the identity of the mysterious visitor. It was Tom Pappas, head of Esso in Greece, "who has just returned from Washington with a private message from President Nixon," Tasca announced. The merry mood of the prominent dinner guests, enjoying their first opportunity for an exchange of views with the US Ambassador, changed drastically. Bad choice for the Athens position indeed.

[PHK]

Ed: Many thanks for helping to illustrate my point. It is important who the US sends as Ambassadors and as far as I'm concerned, a bad choice is far worse than none at all.