Don't Bomb Iran - Steal This Post

by Patricia Kushlis, Cheryl Rofer, Patricia Lee Sharpe, and Linda Durham

Don’t Bomb Iran
Bombing is wrong and would be counterproductive

Credible news reports indicate that the Bush administration is planning for a bombing campaign against Iran, possibly including nuclear strikes. However, nuclear weapons experts believe that Iran will need at least three years to develop nuclear weapons and more likely five to ten years. There is no imminent danger.

Iran has admitted to past violations, but current evidence suggests that Iran is in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. An attack with conventional weapons would attract few or no allies and result in diminished non-military power for the US. First use of nuclear weapons, by the only country to have used them before, would put the US in major breach of longstanding international norms. America would become a pariah, a rogue nation, condemned and isolated by all.

Such strikes would be impractical as well as wrong. Military strategists have suggested that the US could avoid counterattacks from a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities if attacks on Iran's retaliatory capacity were launched simultaneously. Others believe that popular support for the Islamic Republic would crumble under such stress. They are mistaken.

Iran is not Iraq. It is more populous and intensely nationalistic. Despite strong political differences among Iranians, bombing Iran would generate a unifying patriotic response. The Ahmadinejad regime would be strengthened, and consequences for US policy throughout the Muslim world would be severe. Even crippled by air strikes, Iran could worsen the situation in Iraq and launch terrorist attacks on Israel by mobilizing Hezbollah and others. Unilateral US attacks on Iran might also cause turmoil in Middle Eastern oil fields, especially in Saudi Arabia, whose wells are located in heavily Shiite regions, and would enrage Shiite communities in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon and elsewhere. Demagogues would preach that the long expected US-led crusade had begun. The US would not be safer.

There is a better way to create a safe world. Iran, the modern seat of an ancient civilization, wishes to be respected in a world where leadership seems open mostly to nuclear powers. Iran must understand that bluster and threat won't lead to a place at the table. The US must also understand that bluster and threat won't stop nuclear proliferation. Multi-party negotiations with Iran are already under way, but the US should expand its Iraq-centered consultations into broader bilateral and regional security talks. Dealing wisely and patiently with the Iran situation will go far to restore the moral and intellectual leadership of US. Through cooperation, not fear, America can achieve a safer, stabler world and a more lasting peace.

Please feel free to use this post with your elected representatives or for public distribution.

Comments

[helmut]

Cheryl, Patricia, Patricia, Linda -

I like this. Thanks for doing it and I'll do what I can to distribute it.

A point, however.... Cheryl and I have communicated a bit on this and I posted a piece on Tuesday about Ahmadinejad's tactics (as well as ongoing pieces).

Last night I was at dinner in DC with a former US diplomat who was stationed for some years in Iran. He suggested my earlier quote from the Hersh article - that the Shiite regions of Iraq would "light up like a Christmas tree" in the case of an Iran bombing - wasn't quite right. He reminded me that a significant difference - lingustic, historical, cultural - is that the Shiites in Iraq are Arabs to the Iranian Shiite Persians, and that Saddam Hussein had himself relied upon Arab Shiite nationalistic support in his early encroachments on Iranian territory at the outset of the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam trusted that Arab nationalism would trump religious similarities with Iran. I now think this could be an important factor to considersince there were at least at the time harsh sentiments towards perceived Persian arrogance.

What I don't know is whether the dynamic in Iraq among Shiites has shifted significantly since the invasion and occupation by the US. I think this is tough to read. There seems to be little respect for the US among all Iraqis. There appear to be significant differences even within the Iraqi Shiite community. It's unclear if solidarity with Iran would today trump worries about the worsening security situation in Iraq.

Helmut

[MT]

Do you think any part of the hawks' alleged temptation to nuke Iran is a perceived need to test to that the warheads still work? From news reports I sense that since the test bans there's concern about such stuff.

[CKR]

Helmut - Thanks for your support and insights.

MT - I think that a desire to test nukes is a minor factor, if at all. I suspect that ideology is more important to the nuke-warriors. There seems to be a desire to make nukes "just one more weapon," as well.

Your question does bring up yet one more currently very muddled issue, that of the United States' aging nuclear arsenal. Walter Pincus reports on a part of that issue today.

I've been wanting to do a post on it, but writing this Iran piece has taken priority.

Here's a quick rundown of the issues, with condensed pros and cons.

1. Early expectations of weapon lifetimes were at about the current ages of most of the weapons in the stockpile. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has been looking into questions of safety and effectiveness and seem not to have come up with any showstoppers; in fact, the evidence seems to be that the weapons should have a much longer lifetime than was projected. Richard Garwin, who has been an insider in the nuclear weapons community for a very long time, recently stated that there are no problems with the current stockpile that warrant a new design of warhead. Sorry, no link on that; it seems to have disappeared.

2. The US and Russia have been reducing their stockpiles from Cold War levels. The Treaty of Moscow pledges the US and Russia to reduce their "strategic nuclear warheads" to 1700-2200 by 2012. The number Pincus gives, 3000-4000 warheads, allows for backups. Arms control treaties (bad words to this administration) have counted only deployed warheads, those that are ready to go and in positions that can be counted. The Treaty of Moscow seems to go further, but it contains no verification requirements. Pincus may be optimistic; there have been indications that the administration plans to store several thousand warheads, although they also have been making strong statements about reducing numbers. If Pincus's number is an official administration number and not his surmise (can't tell from the article), then it is the lowest they have given yet. Presumably the weapons being taken out of the stockpile to meet these goals are the most difficult to maintain.

3. The threats we now face are very different from those of the Cold War, for which the current arsenal was designed. However, I have not seen any Herman Kahn-like analyses of the possible uses of nuclear weapons, now and in the future. Presumably such studies are being done within the classified realms. Pincus's article is typical of what we hear: that we need a new warhead for safety and for the new challenges. The beefed-up permissive action link Pincus discusses is new. So do we really need new designs or is this an excuse to make smaller nuclear weapons that have a higher probability of being used? We can't tell.

There's more I'd like to say, but this is already a very long answer to your question. I'll write another post on the subject, but it's hard to say when.

[MT]

Thanks very much for that primer. Say, how about attaching to your circular this animated explanation of the practical imprudence of nuclear bunker busters for deep bunkers, which the Union of Concerned Scientists has put out? Alas I had to use MS Explorer to get it to work.