India, the United States, and the NPT

by CKR

Our speaker couldn’t come at the last minute. So the steering committee of the Los Alamos Committee on Arms Control and International Security decided that Wednesday night’s public meeting would be a round table discussion on the nuclear deal with India.

About twenty people arrived, some who had read the last-minute change notice, and some who hadn’t. We had all been thinking about the deal with India and what it meant anyway, although some said they wished they had been able to prepare better.

No matter. The expertise around the table ranged from weapons design to environmental cleanup to arms control treaties and the inner workings of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I’d say that some of the people there have forgotten more about neutrons than I will ever knew, but I doubt they’ve forgotten anything at all. It was a pleasure and a privilege for me to participate

I’ll try to summarize the substance of our discussion. I didn’t take notes, so I can’t attribute particular insights. Roger Snodgrass covered the meeting for the Los Alamos Monitor. I’ll expand on some of the points and provide links for some of the facts we didn’t have at our fingertips. I’ll be happy for participants to add and correct via the comments.

On 18 July 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement on cooperation between the United States and India. That statement raised eyebrows and concerns about the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. I’ve added emphasis.

Recognizing the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner, the two leaders discussed India's plans to develop its civilian nuclear energy program.

President Bush conveyed his appreciation to the Prime Minister over India's strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation and stated that as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. The President told the Prime Minister that he will work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security. The President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, and the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur. In the meantime, the United States will encourage its partners to also consider this request expeditiously. India has expressed its interest in ITER and a willingness to contribute. The United States will consult with its partners considering India's participation. The United States will consult with the other participants in the Generation IV International Forum with a view toward India's inclusion.

The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.

The President welcomed the Prime Minister's assurance. The two leaders agreed to establish a working group to undertake on a phased basis in the months ahead the necessary actions mentioned above to fulfill these commitments. The President and Prime Minister also agreed that they would review this progress when the President visits India in 2006.

India, along with Pakistan and Israel, has not signed the NPT. So it’s been excluded from world trade in civilian nuclear reactors and related materials and equipment. India is unabashed about having nuclear weapons and is unwilling to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Other nations are just as adamantly opposed to its joining the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state.

The early reaction to the joint statement was that it severely undermines the NPT. In the mold of the current administration’s preference for avoiding treaties and multinational forums, it appears to be a bilateral agreement. It also raises questions of motivating states like Iran and North Korea to present the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a fait accompli. But the outcomes that the joint statement projects cannot occur without the consent of the United States Congress and the multinational Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (fact sheets: US government, Federation of American Scientists, Arms Control Association).

On 8 September, the administration put forth its position in testimony to the House International Relations Committee by R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

In this testimony, India’s obligations were laid out.

India will assume the same responsibilities and practices as other countries with advanced nuclear programs. We expect India to take clear steps in the coming months to fulfill its part of the agreement. India has agreed to:

• Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs and file a declaration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its civilian facilities;

• Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;

• Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;

• Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;

• Work with the U.S. for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) to halt production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;

• Refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and support efforts to limit their spread; and

• Secure nuclear and missile materials and technologies through comprehensive export control legislation and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Now this sounds pretty much like the obligations of the nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, with a few additional things thrown in, like the moratorium on nuclear testing that the nuclear-weapon states have been observing since 1992. Further, it effectively makes the IAEA the arbiter of India’s compliance, rather than the United States. This may be the reason that Muhammed ElBaradei has endorsed the agreement, with reservations. This may be available as video at the Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference web site. I haven’t had time to listen to them. A transcript would be appreciated, Carnegie!

India has long wanted recognition as one of the big boys, the ones with nuclear weapons. India also has ambitions to generate electricity largely by nuclear power. It has deposits of uranium and thorium. Most of its current nuclear reactors are heavy-water-moderated CANDU types. Canada cooperated with India on nuclear energy until India’s nuclear weapons intentions became clear. So those reactors are getting old.

If India is to grow industrially, it needs an expansion of electrical power that only nuclear can provide. Its other energy resources are not sufficient, although exploration for offshore petroleum deposits has begun.

What does the United States get out of this? A positive relationship with India that has been elusive since Indian independence. A counterbalance to China. Undoubtedly American companies would like expand their business into building nuclear reactors for India. Perhaps the agreement is seen by some in the administration as another statement of US power, negotiated outside NPT channels.

But as the NPT was being ratified, many countries made individual agreements with the IAEA, which were then codified by NPT ratification and later by Additional Protocols. So the path that India is treading is not without precedent, and ultimately the IAEA will be the party that India must satisfy as to its safeguards.

An NPT-like agreement with India could lead to agreements with the other two non-NPT states, although Joseph specifically excluded that possibility at this time in his testimony.

The United States has no plans to seek full civil nuclear cooperation with Israel or Pakistan.

Pakistan, however, is already asking for a similar agreement.

The key to the agreement is in the separation of India’s civilian and military facilities. India is to “identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs and file a declaration with the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding its civilian facilities” and place the civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards. Because India’s nuclear program has developed outside the strictures of the NPT, many of its facilities combine civilian and military functions. Separating these functions will not be simple. India will want negotiations to proceed quickly. That desire can be used to encourage as wide a definition of civilian facilities as possible.

The Bush administration has stated that it would like to have arrangements in place by the time President Bush visits New Delhi in early 2006. Haste on the US’s part could work against secure arrangements.

India’s stated willingness to cooperate with the United States to develop a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty is somewhat hollow, given that the United States has declared an FMCT unverifiable and has cut off negotiations. Some observers, for example David Albright (short pdf), suggest that India must cap its production of fissile material for weapons now or in the near future.

Congress must make modifications in some laws. The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group has taken no action on the administration’s proposal, with Japan voicing concern. Chinese media are beginning to criticize the US-India deal.

Mohammed ElBaradei said that the agreement, "properly managed, would take us some way forward." The key is in those words, “properly managed.”

Comments

[nadehzda]

Many thanks for the excellent primer and all that linky goodness! Like you, I was struck by ElBaradei's relaxed approach. Clearly, he prefers India inside the tent as the pressure for nuclear power in the developing world continues to grow. And the positive aspects of precedent are intriguing.

[Siddharth]

If folks are interested in the India-US nuclear deal, you can find a lot more discussion on the issues involved -- from an Indian perspective -- please visit my website (svaradarajan.blogspot.com) and see the stuff on the main page as well as the link on the left on Nuclear Issues.

[CKR]

Siddharth, thanks for stopping by and linking to your blog.

Siddharth Varadarajan is Deputy Editor of The Hindu, one of India's leading newspapers.

I hope to be able to respond to some of his points.