I haven't read the report yet, and I don't know whether I will be able to do so soon (I'm traveling over the weekend), so here are some preliminary thoughts and questions I will be looking for.
What was it that led George Tenet to say to George Bush, "It's a slam dunk" when Bush questioned the intelligence? This report in Bob Woodward's book has seemed bizarre to me. Why did Bush accept such a lame response?
Does the report address the degree of reliance by the decision-makers on information supplied by Ahmed Chalabi's network? What was the basis for this reliance?
How did the analysts express their degrees of uncertainty about the data? What were the checks, for example, that data was coming from independent sources? Did the decision-makers ask for uncertainty measures? Did they do so selectively, on the information they didn't like while accepting the information they did?
What kinds of sources provided the data, and where could different or additional sources have made a difference?
Were there institutional/structural difficulties within and between the intelligence agencies that kept a better analysis from being done? What were they? Were there motives of careerism and inflating the roles of individuals, groups or agencies that damaged the intelligence process. I'm trying to get at the question of a malfunctioning organization here, but this needs to be done in more depth and dimensions than seem to have been addressed so far. Frequently, within a bureaucracy, personal idiosyncrasies can do as much damage as structural problems. This is very hard to get at unless you're working with the credit-grabber or stump in the middle of the road.